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ABSTRACT
Essays in Game Theory and Institutions. (August 2006)
Birendra Kumar Rai, B.Tech., Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Rajiv Sarin
This dissertation is a compilation of essays highlighting the usefulness of game
theory in understanding socio-economic phenomena. The second chapter tries to
provide a reason for the strict codes of conduct that have been imposed on unmar-
ried girls in almost every society at some point of time in its history using tools
from classical game theory. If men prefer to marry submissive women, then par-
ents of girls will have an incentive to signal the submissiveness of their daughters
in various ways in order to attract better matches. At the same time, parents will
find it costlier to signal the submissiveness of girls who are not really submissive.
This line of reasoning thus helps us interpret phenomena such as veiling, foot-
binding, and sequestration of women in general as signals of submissiveness.
The third chapter attempts to rationalize some of the ad hoc rules proposed
for dividing a bankrupt estate using tools from evolutionary game theory. The ad
hoc rules differ from each other because of the axioms that are imposed in addition
to efficiency and claims boundedness. Efficiency requires that the estate be com-
pletely divided between the claimants, and claims boundedness requires that no
claimant be awarded more than her initial contribution. This dissertation tries to
show that an ad hoc rule can be rationalized as the unique self-enforcing long run
outcome of Young’s [46] evolutionary bargaining model by using certain intuitive
rules for the Nash demand game.
In the fourth chapter I present a simple model of conflict over inputs in an
iv
economy with ill-defined property rights. Agents produce output from the land
they hold, which in turn can be allocated to consumption or the production of
guns. There is no agency to enforce rights over the initial land holdings, and the
future holdings of land are determined using a contest success function that de-
pends on the guns produced by both agents. I characterize the equilibria in which
only one, both, and none of the agents produce guns, as a function of the total land
and the inequality of initial land holdings for general forms of utility, production,
cost, and contest success functions.
vTo Amma and Babuji
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The disappointments with the classical game theory literature that assumed per-
fect rationality on part of the agents has over the years given way to models that
assume economic agents are boundedly rational. It is only in very simple strategic
situations that we can hope the assumption of perfect rationality will give behav-
iorally sound predictions. The questions I raise in my dissertation and the tools I
use to address them reflect this realization.
The second chapter tries to provide a reason for the strict codes of conduct
that have been imposed on unmarried girls in almost every society at some point
of time in its history using tools from classical game theory. If men prefer to marry
submissive women then parents of girls will have an incentive to signal the sub-
missiveness of their daughters in various ways in order to attract better matches.
At the same time, parents will find it costlier to signal the submissiveness of girls
that are not really submissive. This line of reasoning thus helps us interpret phe-
nomena such as veiling, foot-binding, and sequestration of women in general, as
signals of submissiveness. The undefeated equilibria of the underlying game lead
to a unique separating outcome when the frequency of obedient and submissive
girls is not quite high; and to a unique pooling equilibrium when this frequency is
sufficiently high.
The third chapter attempts to rationalize the adhoc rules proposed in the lit-
erature for dividing a bankrupt estate using tools from evolutionary game theory.
The adhoc rules differ from each other because of the axioms that are imposed
This dissertation follows the style of Journal of Economic Theory.
2in addition to efficiency and claims boundedness. Efficiency requires that the estate
be completely divided between the claimants, and claims boundedness requires
that no claimant be awarded more than her initial contribution. The paper tries to
show that an adhoc rule can be rationalized as the unique self-enforcing long run
outcome of Young’s [46] evolutionary bargaining model by using certain intuitive
rules for the Nash demand game. If the agents bargain in the framework of the
usual demand game, the long run stochastically stable equilibrium turns out to be
equal division of the estate. If, in addition to the usual rules, demanding more
than one’s initial claim leads to a zero payoff (claims boundedness) then the long
run equilibrium corresponds to the constrained equal awards rule. If the rules
of the demand game capture both efficiency and claims boundedness, then the
long run equilibrium corresponds to the division proposed by the truncated claims
proportional rule.
In the fourth chapter I present a simple model of conflict over inputs in an
economy with ill-defined property rights. The economy consists of two agents ini-
tially holding unequal amounts of the total available land. The agents produce
output from the land they hold which in turn can be allocated to consumption or
the production of guns. There is no agency to enforce rights over the initial land
holdings and the future holdings of land are determined using a contest success
function which depends on the guns produced by both agents. Agents maximize
the weighted sum of utility from current consumption and the utility from future
land holding. I characterize equilibria in which only one, both, and none of the
agents produces guns, as a function of the total land and the inequality of initial
land holdings for general forms of utility, production, cost, and contest success
functions. The final chapter provides concluding remarks and raises some ques-
tions for future research.
3CHAPTER II
OF VEILS AND WEDDING RINGS
A. Introduction
Women have been viewed and valued very differently across cultures throughout
our history. Even today these differentials are enormous within and across coun-
tries. It would be fair to say that parents in several cultures try hard to inculcate
the traits of submissiveness and obedience in their unmarried daughters (Cheung
[9], Ebrey and Watson [15], O’Faolain and Martines [37], Hill [23], Klapisch-Zuber
[25], Stone [42]). Apart from the behavioral indoctrination, different cultures have
come up with novel ways to alter the manner in which girls interact with the space
and society around them. Some of the enduring features include the sequestration
of girls, the veil in Islamic countries, the now extinct foot-binding in China, and
genital mutilation in several parts of Africa.
Marriage is probably the most social event in the life of a girl in traditional
societies. The importance of the measures parents take to prepare their daughters
for marriage can be gauged by the beliefs regarding an ideal wife and the severity
of punishment for transgressions after marriage. The prescriptions for an ideal
spouse have hardly ever stressed a man who is obedient to the women, but in
all cultures at some time in their history the ideal woman has been one who is
obedient to her husband. Similarly, there is hardly any evidence of a society that
imposes greater controls on the premarital sexual behavior of men. At all times in
history adulterous women have been at least as strongly punished as adulterous
men (Murstein [30]). The legal codes of present day Syria, Jordan, Morocco, and
Haiti do not recognize a man killing his wife as a murderer if the wife is accused of
4adultery. In Brazil and Colombia similar laws have been struck down over the past
two decades. It is estimated that nearly two thousand women become the victims
of ’honor killings’ by their close kin every year, sometimes for ’crimes’ such as
talking to men other than their relatives. It is difficult to deny that the breach of
the marriage contract by women has been considered a bigger crime, than a breach
by men.
Providing her husband with a child has been one of the main functions of a
married girl in traditional societies. We assume that men will prefer those women
as marriage partners who can establish the credentials for post marital fidelity.
This is because men do not have absolute certainty regarding the paternity of a
child, and they care more about their ’own’ children. This argument has a long
history starting from the ancient Greco-Roman philosophers, and carried on by
medieval theologians and ideologues to the modern evolutionary biologists, an-
thropologists, and economists (Alexander and Tinkle [1981], Klapisch-Zuber [25],
O’Faolain and Martines [37]).
Although girls in traditional societies are confined both before and after mar-
riage, the main purpose of confinement seems to differ. Parents confine their
daughters prior to marriage to signal her credentials for post marital fidelity. Hus-
bands confine their wives after marriage to avoid moral hazard. It seems more rea-
sonable to analyze premarital confinement as a signaling game, whereas a principal-
agent model suits the analysis of post marital confinement.
The mechanics of the Gale-Shapely matching algorithm involve sequential
proposals from one side and rejection/acceptance from the other side of the mar-
ket given the rankings of all players (Roth and Sotomayor [39]). The primary focus
of matching literature is to determine the set of stable matchings. We, instead,
intend to elaborate on the process through which the players come up with their
5rankings and show that parents confine their daughters so that men would rank
them higher. As a clarification, imagine the approach graduate schools might take
to deal with a large number of applicants. In the first stage, the committee might
come up with rules of thumb, like anyone with an undergraduate GPA of less than
2.0 would not be admitted. Once the list has been shortened by using one or sev-
eral such arbitrary (but undoubtedly useful) criterion, the committee might then
review each application and come up with the final admissions in the second stage
of decision making. Our efforts could be thought of as explorations of only the
first stage of admissions process and the main aim is to show that restrictions on
women are equilibrium outcomes of a suitably defined game. The second stage
which involves determining the exact pairings and their properties has been dealt
with extensively by the matching literature and we do not pursue it here (Becker
[6]).
It is widely accepted in the sociology and anthropology literature on cross-
cultural studies that within communities that do confine females, rich families con-
fine their girls and women more severely than the poor ones (Broude [8]). Purely
economic motivations can explain why women of poor families are less confined;
but they do not explain why women of rich families are more confined. If labor
markets are not sufficiently developed, or the production technology is not favor-
able for women to earn high returns, women of rich families may not work. But
this does not imply that rich men would ’choose’ to confine the women in their
families in various ways. Therefore, for the sake of clarity, we consider an econ-
omy in which women only have reproductive value and no productive value.
If we are willing to accept that women have a comparative advantage in rear-
ing young children and household work we might be able to explain why married
women spend more time indoors. But this does not explain why they would not
6be allowed to interact with other men. In any case this line of reasoning does not
help us to understand why girls are confined prior to marriage. Therefore, we only
try to explore premarital confinement of girls by their parents and argue that this
obviates the reasons for post marital confinement. Parents of girls usually start
placing restrictions on her around the onset of puberty and maintain it till her
marriage (Broude [8]). Different girls might get married at different ages but we
assume only qualitative differences in the extent of claustration and thus avoid the
dynamic issues that might arise (Noldeke and van Damme [36]).
It is assumed that there exist temperamental differences among girls in the
degree to which to they are submissive/obedient at the time parents start confin-
ing them. The extent of confinement by parents positively affects their degree of
obedience. It is also assumed that the costs incurred by the parents of a girl in this
process are psychic in nature with the cost of confinement to any extent being less
for a more obedient girl than for a less obedient girl. There is asymmetric informa-
tion in the sense that potential suitors can only (perfectly and costlessly) observe
the extent of confinement but not the true nature of a girl.
We abstract from any transfers associated with marriage. Each man is as-
sumed to care more about his ’own’ children which in turn motivates him to con-
sider the likelihood that a girl will remain fidel after marriage and sire ’his’ chil-
dren. This concern of men is formalized by assuming that the value of a girl to a
potential suitor depends on her inherent character and extent of confinement. A
suitor is valued by the parents of a girl because of the resources he can provide to
their daughter and her children. The utility derived by the parents of a girl is thus
assumed to be the wealth of the suitor net of their psychic costs incurred in raising
her. Men decide whether to propose to a girl or not, and the girl’s parents choose
whether to accept the proposal or not. We employ sequential equilibrium as the
7solution concept for the game and discuss the nature and meaning of the equilibria
that emerge.
B. The Model
The inherent nature of girls (their submissiveness/obedience) when parents start
confining is assumed to be of two types t ∈ (h, l), with a common prior, P (h) = q.
The extent to which parents of a girl confine her is denoted by e. The confinement
of a girl reflects not only the physical constraints on her movement, association,
and interaction with other men but also the moral and behavioral education and
indoctrination by family members. Confinement in this model plays a role similar
to education in job signaling models. The cost of confinement to the extent e for a
type-t girl is given by c(t, e), with c(t, 0) = 0, ce(t, e) > 0, cee(t, e) > 0, ct(t, e) < 0
, and cet(t, e) < 0 for all e ≥ 0. Thus, there is no cost to the parents if they do not
confine their daughter, marginal costs of confinement are positive and increasing
with increases in the extent of confinement for both types of girls, and the marginal
cost of confining type-l girl is greater than that of type-h girl, at all levels of con-
finement. The net utility to the parents of a girl of a proposal from a suitor having
wealth w is [w − c(t, e)].
The value of the girl-(t, e) to potential suitors is [αv(t, e)] with the constant
α ∈ (0, 1), and v(h, e) > v(l, e) for all e, and ve(t, e) > 0 for both t and all e. This
value function of men defined over girls primarily reflects the likelihood of the
child from the girl being his own. This should not be taken to imply that girls
or their parents do not care about the nature and character of suitors. However,
we presume it would add little in our efforts to explain why it is men that often
set up extensive and sometimes excessive mechanisms to confine women. Also,
8the value function should be thought of as reflecting the ’perceived’ value to men
from marrying the girl-(t, e). The positive partial effect of confinement ignores the
possibility that extreme confinement might lead a girl to become more rebellious
and less obedient. The indifference curves of parents of girls are upward sloping
and convex in the and the (e, w) space. The value functions of girls as perceived by
men are linear in the (e, w) space.
It is assumed that every man will have to bear some unavoidable cost of pro-
viding for the girl he ends up marrying and the resulting children, irrespective of
the type of the girl and her level of confinement. It might well be the case that
the expenditure by a man on his wife is determined endogenously. However, we
presume that men enter the marriage market with a rough idea of how much they
would have to spend on their future wife and any adjustments to this expenditure
can be done only after he actually gets married. Further assume that the abso-
lute amount of this expenditure is increasing in the wealth of men. A convenient
way to formalize this is to assume that the fixed cost equals a constant fraction of
wealth. As a result the resources spent by different men will be different for the
same girl. The utility function of men is thus assumed to be
um(t, e, w) =

α · v(t, e) + (1− α).w if married to girl − (t, e)
w if unmarried
(2.1)
The timing of the game is as follows: nature determines the type of each girl
with P (h) being q, parents choose the extent of confinement of girls, men observe
the extent of confinement and update their beliefs regarding the type of each girl,
decide upon the girls they would be willing to propose to, and then parents of girls
decide whether to accept an offer or not. We are assuming that it is the parents of
9the girl who ultimately decide her match.
The value of a girl known to be of type-t with certainty is [αv(t, e)]. If type is
private information then µ(h|e) is the common assessment by suitors that the girl
is of type-h after having observed her extent of confinement e. The expected value
of girl-(t, e) to suitors is α[µ(h|e).v(h, e)+(1−µ(h|e)).v(l, e)]. I make the simplifying
assumption that men would not mind proposing to those girls that leave them at
least as well off as in the unmarried state. Thus a girl-(t, e) would receive proposals
only from men having wealth w such that
α.[µ(h|e).v(h, e) + (1− µ(h|e)).v(l, e)] + (1− α).w ≥ w (2.2)
This helps us define the critical suitor wealth function, the wealthiest man will-
ing to propose to a girl of unknown type, as a function of her observable level of
confinement.We have
wc(e) = µ(h|e).v(h, e) + (1− µ(h|e)).v(l, e) (2.3)
where wc(e) will be linear in e with an intercept and slope between the intercepts
and slopes of v(l, e) and v(h, e). Without loss of generality it can be assumed that
for any girl-(t, e) there exist men with wealth w ≥ wc(e). This ensures that we will
always have equilibria in which each girl would get a proposal. Also, a continu-
ous distribution of wealth actually simplifies the analysis because with a discrete
number of wealth classes we will have to characterize the equilibria as a function
of the ’levels’ of wealth associated with those discrete classes.
d(e|w) is an indicator function which equals 1 if the suitor having wealth w
would be willing to propose to a girl who has been confined to the extent e, and
equals 0 otherwise. Sequential Equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson [27]) will be used
as the solution concept for this signaling game.
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Since we have allowed girls to be of only two types there will be bunching
of all girls at a single level of confinement in a pooling equilibrium, and at two
levels of confinement in the separating equilibrium. Thus, each parent would op-
timally want to match their daughter to the same man in the pooling equilibrium.
Similarly, in the separating equilibrium, the optimal suitor for daughters of one
set of parents would be a particular man, and the remaining parents would prefer
to match with another particular man. This feature of the equilibrium can not be
eliminated even by allowing the type of girls to be a continuum unless we make
additional assumptions on the measures of types of girls and wealth of men. We
take this to imply that men use the type and confinement of women as a prelim-
inary and crude sorting device to decompose the set of all women into two non-
overlapping sets- one comprising of girls they would be willing to propose to, and
the other consisting of girls they would not propose to. As mentioned earlier, the
aim of this paper is to show that parents of girl would confine their daughters lest
resourceful men put them in the set they will not propose to.
1. Complete Information About Type
We start our analysis with the complete information case where we assume that the
type of a girl is common knowledge. Parents of girl-(t, e) will accept the proposal
from the critical suitor in order to maximize their utility. Since the critical suitor’s
wealth is increasing in e parents of a girl choose the optimal extent of confining her
by maximizing the net benefit, i. e.,
maxe [v(t, e)− c(t, e)] (2.4)
With complete information regarding types the optimal extent of confinement
is denoted as e∗(t), and the critical suitor’s wealth w∗(t) = v(t, e∗(t)). The as-
11
sumptions on the value function of girls and the cost function suggest that the
net marginal benefits for type-h parents are greater than that for the type-l par-
ents, for any given e. The optimal extent of confinement is reached when the net
marginal benefits of confinement become zero. We thus expect type-h parents to
optimally choose a greater level of confinement for their daughters. The girl-(t, e)
offers the same confidence of paternity to every man. Since rich men spend greater
amount of resources in absolute terms they will in turn demand a greater level of
confidence, which will be reflected in their decision of proposing to relatively high
(t, e)-girls.
2. Incomplete Information About Type
We now assume that the type of a girl is private information and only the extent of
confinement is publicly observable. The parents of type-l girls can always ensure
themselves of a proposal from the suitor having wealth w∗(l). The worst that can
happen to a parent of type-h girl is suitors believing that their daughter is instead
type-l. In such a case the optimal level of confinement chosen by parents of this
type-h girl will be denoted by e∗(h→ l).
a. Separating Equilibria
The characterization of separating sequential equilibrium involves the considera-
tion of both the no-envy and envy cases. In the no-envy case type-l parents do not
find it profitable to mimic the confinement choice made by the type-h parents; in
the envy case they do, unless the type-h parents choose a sufficiently high level
of confinement. In the no-envy case the indifference curve of type-l parents pass-
ing through (e∗(l), w∗(l)) intersects the indifference curve of type-h parents passing
12
through point (e∗(l), w∗(l)) intersects at an e > e∗(h); in the envy case these indiffer-
ence curves intersect at an e < e∗(h). The strategy of parents of girls in the no-envy
separating equilibrium, wherein the type-l girls can not profitably pretend to be
type-h, thus involves
[e(l) = e∗(l), e(h) = e∗(h)] (2.5)
The beliefs of men after observing these choices of e are
µ(h|e∗(l)) = 0 and µ(h|e∗(h)) = 1 (2.6)
d(e|w) =

1 if e = e∗(l) and w ≤ w∗(l)
1 if e = e∗(h) and w ≤ w∗(h)
0 otherwise
(2.7)
The simple interpretation of these strategies is that if a girl is confined more,
she is more desirable. In order to completely characterize this separating equi-
librium we need to specify the beliefs of men for out of equilibrium choices of e,
which will in turn determine the rest of their strategy. One set of beliefs that satis-
fies the required conditions is that the girl is of type-h only if she has been confined
to an extent at least as high as e∗(h). Formally
µ(h|e) =

1 if e ≥ e∗(h)
0 otherwise
(2.8)
The strategy of men in the no-envy case can now be fully specified as
13
d(e|w) =

1 if e ≤ e∗(h) and w ≤ w∗(l)
1 if e ≥ e∗(h) and w ≤ w∗(h)
0 otherwise
(2.9)
Intuitively this means that a girl who has been confined to a greater extent will
receive proposals from all those who are willing to propose to the less confined
girl, and in addition some more proposals from wealthier men. Since e∗(h) is the
best response by the type-h parents in response to the value placed on high type
girls (v(h, e)), it is also the best response in this case. Similarly, e∗(l) is the best
response of the type-l parents in response to the value placed on their girls as their
maximum payoff [w∗(l) − c(l, e∗(l))] among all the choices of e < e∗(h) is realized
by choosing e = e∗(l).
In the envy case, by definition, the h-type parents will not be able to distin-
guish their daughters from the l-types by choosing e∗(h). The maximum level of
confinement which type-l parents will have an incentive to mimic leaves them ex-
actly as well off as they are when their type is perfectly known to be l. Parents of
type-h will be able to signal their high type only by choosing an e ≥ es > e∗(h).
The strategies of parents of girls will thus be
[e(l) = e∗(l), e(h) = es] (2.10)
The equilibrium beliefs of men would be
µ(h|e∗(l)) = 0 and µ(h|es) = 1 (2.11)
An intuitive specification of out of equilibrium beliefs of men is
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µ(h|e) =

1 if e ≥ es
0 if e < es
(2.12)
This implies that men, while trying not to be deceived by type-l parents posing as
type-h, will form beliefs such that only if the extent of confinement is greater than
the minimum level of confinement that certainly differentiates the types, would
they be willing to accept a girl as type-h. Finally, the complete strategy profile of
men would be
d(e|w) =

1 if e < es and w ≤ w∗(l)
1 if e ≥ es and w ≤ v(h, es)
0 otherwise
(2.13)
Men having w ≤ w∗(l) will propose to both types of girls. The type-h girls would
be able to attract additional proposals from men having wealth w ∈ [w∗(l), v(h, es)].
As discussed above, the l-type parents have two equally good options: choos-
ing e∗(l) and receiving a proposal from the suitor having wealth w∗(l), or choosing
es which raises the maximum offer to v(h, es). We shall always assume in this paper
that any indifference is resolved in favor of the lower extent of confinement. The
choices of e > es for h-type parents are clearly inferior to es as they lead them to
lower indifference curves. Since the indifference curve of the l-type parents pass-
ing through (es, v(h, es)) is tangent to their value function (v(l, e)), hence the less
steep indifference curves of type-h parents passing through (es, v(h, es)) lies above
v(l, e) for e < es. The choices of e < es are thus inferior for type-h parents as any
such choice of e will lead the men to believe that they are of type-l, and thus the
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best these choices can do is allow them to reach an indifference curve that is tan-
gent to v(l, e). Thus, the best response of h-type parents to the strategy of men is to
choose e = es.
There exist other separating equilibria involving a different choice of e by the
type-h parents. For e slightly greater than es such that [v(h, es+) − c(h, es+)] >
[v(l, e)− c(h, e)], the type-h parents prefer to signal the high quality of their daugh-
ters by choosing es+. Substituting es+ for es in the beliefs and strategy of men in the
previous separating equilibrium, along with the strategy [e(l) = e∗(l), e(h) = es+]
for parents of girls, completely specifies this equilibrium.
An example of the separating equilibrium that differs from the one in envy
case off the equilibrium path involves modifying the beliefs of suitors such that it
leaves the optimal strategies of parents (e(l) = e∗(l), e(h) = e∗(h)) unchanged. We
need to ensure that both types of parents will end up on lower indifference curves
if they deviate from their equilibrium strategies. This can be accomplished by
allowing men to attach a strictly positive but sufficiently low probability (q′) that
the girl is type-h after observing an e ∈ (e∗(h), es) such that for all e ∈ (e∗(h), es)
the critical suitor wealth function w(e|q′) lies strictly below the indifference curve
of type-l parents passing through the point (e∗(l), w∗(l)).
b. Pooling Equilibria
Pooling equilibria emerge in both the envy and no-envy cases and the steps used
in characterizing them are same. Hence, we only discuss the more interesting envy
case. The worst that could happen to an h-type girl is that men believe her to be of
type-l. The parents of type-l will have the incentive to pool only if pooling allows
them to reach an indifference curve higher than the one they can attain when their
type is perfectly known or believed by the suitors to be l. The utility that both
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types can ensure by responding optimally when they are believed to be type-l
irrespective of their true type will be termed as their reservation utility (Banks
1991).
The minimum (maximum) e at which pooling is possible is the maximum
(minimum) of the minimum (maximum) level at which the two types are willing
to pool. Pooling equilibria are not possible below a certain value of the prior. All
values of e in the set [eminp , emaxp ] can support a pooling equilibrium similar to the
one described below. We can characterize these equilibria completely by replacing
e∗p by any value of e ∈ [eminp , emaxp ].
In the pooling equilibrium parents of both types of girls choose the same ex-
tent of confinement, say e∗p. Therefore, the updated belief of suitors will be the
same as their prior belief. This in turn implies that the expected benefit each girl,
having been confined to the extent e∗p, provides to any suitor is α[q.v(h, e∗p) + (1 −
q).v(l, e∗p)]. The point (e∗p, w∗p) lies on the line that gives critical suitor’s wealth,
wp(e) = [q.v(h, e) + (1 − q).v(l, e)], where the indifference curves of both types in-
tersect. This point also determines the wealth level of the critical suitor in this
case. All men with wealth w ≤ q.v(h, e∗p) + (1 − q).v(l, e∗p) = w∗p, will be better off
proposing to any girl. We can specify the equilibrium strategy of men as follows.
d(e|w) = 1 if e = e∗p and w ≤ w∗p (2.14)
We still need to specify the beliefs of men, (µ(h|e)) for out of equilibrium choices
of e by parents of girls, which will in turn determine the remaining part of men’s
strategy. The simplest belief that men might have is that any extent of confinement
other than e∗p implies that the girl is of type-l. Thus, if the beliefs of men are
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µ(h|e) =

q if e = e∗p
0 if e 6= e∗p
(2.15)
then their strategy would be
d(e|w) =

1 if e = e∗p and w ≤ w∗p
1 if e 6= e∗p and w ≤ w∗(l)
0 otherwise
(2.16)
This implies that all men with w ≤ w∗p will propose to any girl whose level of
confinement is observed to be e∗p. On the other hand, if the level of confinement
is anything other than e∗p, men take it as an unambiguous signal that the girl is
of type-l, and only men with w ≤ w∗(l) offer a proposal. Now we need to argue
that given the strategies and beliefs of men e∗p is indeed the optimal choice by both
types of parents.
The parents of girl-(t, e) always choose e to maximize [w(e) − c(t, e)]. In this
case, the belief structure of men suggests that parents choose either e∗p or the extent
of confinement that maximizes [v(l, e) − c(t, e)]. Given the shape of indifference
curves and value functions, type-h parents would choose e∗p since their indiffer-
ence curve passing through (e∗p, w∗p) lies above the value function for type-l girls.
Similarly, type-l parents will also be better off choosing e = e∗p since the best al-
ternate option (e∗(l)) leaves them on the lower indifference curve passing through
(e∗(l), w∗(l)).
Yet another category of pooling equilibria can be generated by holding e at e∗p
but varying the beliefs and strategies of men for out of equilibrium choices of e as
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follows.
µ(h|e) =

q if e = e∗p
q if e ≥ ehp
0 if e ≤ ehp except for e = e∗p
(2.17)
where ehp is the extent of confinement at which the indifference curve of the
type-h parents through the point (e∗p, w∗p) crosses the wealth function given by
w = q.v(h, e) + (1 − q).v(l, e). The intuition for this specification comes from the
observation that the parents of type-h are indifferent between (e∗p, w∗p) and (ehp , whp )
but the type-l parents strictly prefer (e∗p, w∗p) over (ehp , whp ). This structure of beliefs
implies that if a girl is confined to an extent greater than a sufficiently high level
(ehp) then men take it as a signal of her extreme desirability that forces her parents
to ’protect’ her from undesirable men. On the other hand, if she is confined any
less than ehp but not at the socially prevalent extent (e∗p) then it is believed to signal
that she is not obedient enough or not good enough, thereby reflecting her l-type.
The resulting strategy of suitors is
d(e|w) =

1 if e = e∗p and w ≤ w∗p
1 if e ≥ ehp and w ≤ w∗p
1 if e ≤ ehp except for e = e∗p and w ≤ w∗(l)
0 otherwise
(2.18)
If a girl is confined to the socially prescribed level e∗p then all men with w ≤ w∗p
propose to her. The same holds true if a girl is confined at a sufficiently higher
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level, i.e., if e ≥ ehp . (Although men believe that if the girl is confined sufficiently
more she must be of type-h, the strategy specifying that only men with w ≤ w∗p
propose to her constitutes an equilibrium, because the equilibrium strategy of all
parents is to confine their daughters to the socially prescribed extent.) If she is
confined less than the sufficiently high level but not at the socially prescribed one,
she is considered to be of type-l and only those men with w ≤ w∗(l) propose to her.
The type-h(l) parents are worse (better) off in the e∗p pooling equilibrium as
compared to the complete information equilibrium. However, only in the envy
case there exists a critical value of the common prior, q, above which type-h parents
are better off in pooling equilibria rather than the separating equilibrium.
C. Refinements of Equilibria
The previous sections describe the various equilibria that can possibly emerge.
Several refinement criterion have been proposed for signaling games to isolate the
plausible equilibria. Since we have considered only two types of girls (senders)
the Intuitive Criterion (Banks and Sobel [5], Cho and Kreps [10]) will provide us
with a unique prediction from all the possible sequential equilibria. It has been
argued that apart from the discontinuity in the unique predicted outcome as the
prior goes from a value very close to unity, to exactly unity, the logical foundations
of forward induction as embodied in the Intuitive Criterion are myopic and thus
inconsistent with perfect rationality. We will therefore compare the final prediction
of the Intuitive Criterion with those obtained from the concept of Undefeated equi-
librium (Mailath et al. [28]) that tries to overcome these shortcomings. We divide
the following discussion into three parts differentiated by low values of the prior
that allow no pooling equilibrium, medium values of the prior that provide the
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type-h parents with highest utility in the separating outcome, and finally high val-
ues of the prior that provide the type-h parents with highest utility in the pooling
equilibrium.
1. Unique Equilibrium for Low Prior
If the maximum level of e at which type-l is willing to pool is lower than the
minimum e at which type-h would be willing to pool, then no pooling equilib-
ria are possible. Thus, in the envy case, we will have separating equilibria with
[e(l) = e∗(l), e(h) ≥ es] and
µ(h|e) =

1 if e ≥ e(h)
0 otherwise
(2.19)
Consider any separating equilibrium in the envy case with e(h) > es. (The
same arguments apply in the no-envy case with es replaced by e∗(h).) This implies
that es will be an off the equilibrium path message with µ(h|es) = 0. But es is a
dominated choice for the type-l parents, and so if es is observed then µ(h|es) = 1.
If so, type-h parents will deviate to es as it provides them with a higher utility,
thereby upsetting the proposed equilibrium. This line of reasoning suggested by
the Intuitive criterion will lead to the unique predicted outcome [e(l) = e∗(l), e(h) =
es] and
µ(h|e) =

1 if e ≥ es
0 otherwise
(2.20)
The Undefeated Equilibrium concept will also select this same outcome as its
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unique prediction in this case; but the logic is different. The intuitive criterion elim-
inated the separating equilibria having confinement of type-h girls greater than es
on the basis of unreasonable out of equilibrium beliefs by arguing that the out
of equilibrium message es is a dominated choice for the type-l parents but still
men attach a positive probability to this message having been sent by them. The
logic of undefeated equilibrium while eliminating the separating equilibria with
e(h) > es, utilizes the fact that there exists another sequential equilibrium in which
es is sent by at least one of the two types of senders. Moreover, it is that very type
(the h-type) which prefers this alternative es equilibrium. Since the beliefs of men
in the e(h) > es equilibrium are not consistent with the beliefs in the e(h) = es
equilibrium, the es equilibrium is said to defeat the e(h) > es equilibria. The only
undefeated equilibrium this process of elimination gives is the es separating equi-
librium, same as the one predicted by the Intuitive Criterion.
2. Unique Equilibrium for Medium Prior
We now consider the case where the prior is high enough to allow pooling but
not high enough to make any pooling equilibria at any prior in this range more
attractive to type-h parents, than the Riley separating equilibrium. For this range
of the priors, we have argued earlier that both pooling and separating equilibria
are possible. Separating equilibria with e(h) > es fail the intuitive criterion by
a reasoning similar to the one employed in the case of low priors. In order to
understand why all the pooling equilibria also fail the intuitive criterion, consider
a candidate pooling equilibrium in the envy case with [e(l) = e(h) = e∗p] and
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µ(h|e) =

q if e = e∗p
0 if e 6= e∗p
(2.21)
This implies that es will be an out of equilibrium message. The specification of
the e∗p pooling equilibrium under study requires µ(l|es) > 0. But es is a dominated
choice for type-l parents, and so if es is observed the receivers must attribute it
to the h-types. This in turn implies that µ(l|es) = 0. If so, the h-types will have
an incentive to deviate to es as it leads them to a higher indifference curve, thus
upsetting the proposed equilibrium. Hence, the only equilibrium consistent with
the intuitive criterion is the Riley separating outcome with e(h) > es.
The undefeated criterion will give the same result in this case as well. Let
pooling at e∗p be the equilibrium under consideration which involves µ(l|es) > 0.
The only sequential equilibrium in which es is sent as an equilibrium message has
the h-types sending it. Also, it is only the h-types that prefer this Riley outcome
over the pooling equilibrium with e = e∗p, and it has µ(l|es) = 0. All the pooling
equilibria are thus defeated by the Riley separating equilibrium. It also defeats all
the other separating equilibria with e(h) > es. Hence, in the case of medium priors
also, both the intuitive and the undefeated criterion select the Riley separating
equilibrium as the unique prediction.
3. Unique Equilibrium for High Prior
We now consider the case where the prior is high enough not only to allow pooling
but also to make some pooling equilibria, at each value of the prior in this range,
more attractive to type-h parents than the Riley separating equilibrium. This is
the most interesting of the three cases as it clarifies the logical inconsistencies of
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forward induction. Consider the pooling equilibrium with [e(l) = e(h) = e∗p] and
µ(h|e) =

q if e = e∗p
0 if e 6= e∗p
(2.22)
Any level of confinement eoeq ∈ (e′ , e”) will be an out of equilibrium message.
Regardless of the beliefs men will form after observing eoeq, the l-types would be
worse off by sending it compared to the e∗p pooling equilibrium. If men instead
believe that eoeq was sent by the h-types, then their best response would be to
offer v(h, eoeq), and this would yield a higher utility to the h-type parents than
they were getting in the e∗p pooling equilibrium under study. Thus, h-types would
deviate from e∗p to eoeq, thereby upsetting the pooling equilibrium. This is where the
argument of Intuitive Criterion ends while eliminating the e∗p pooling equilibrium
because it involves unreasonable beliefs at out of equilibrium messages eoeq.
Is the reasoning employed above sound? If men believe that it is the h-type
parents sending eoeq, then they will indeed be better off by sending it. But, if all
players in the game are assumed to understand the underlying logic of intuitive
criterion then the l-type parents should realize that after observing e∗p men will
conclude that it must have been sent by the l-types. The crux of undefeated cri-
terion is that beliefs at off equilibrium path information sets can not be adjusted
while keeping beliefs on the equilibrium path unchanged. Thus, the l-type parents
cannot ensure that their daughters will receive proposals from men having wealth
w ∈ [w∗(l), wp(e∗p)]. Moreover, if they were to deviate to eoeq then these l-types
would definitely get proposals from men having w > w∗(l). And if they do choose
eoeq, then it no longer remains an unambiguous signal of an h-type girl.
What is the logical end of this thought process? More importantly, what would
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be ’reasonable’ beliefs after a deviation from the equilibrium path is observed. The
undefeated criterion suggests that the beliefs that should be formed after observing
an out of equilibrium message should be consistent with the one that is formed
when this message is sent as an equilibrium message in some other sequential
equilibrium. The Riley separating equilibrium will defeat all the other separating
equilibria as in the previous two cases. Now, let the Riley equilibrium be under
consideration and the pooling at e∗p be the alternate equilibrium. With respect to
the Riley equilibrium, e∗p is an out of equilibrium message with µ(h|e∗p) = µ(h|e∗p) =
q. Since both types prefer the alternative pooling equilibrium to the separating
equilibrium under study, the beliefs in the separating equilibrium after observing
e∗p should be consistent with the beliefs in the alternate pooling equilibrium. But,
they are inconsistent; the separating equilibrium specifies µ(l|e∗p) = 0. Hence, the
alternate equilibrium (pooling at e∗p) defeats the equilibrium under study (the Riley
separating equilibrium).
The only equilibrium that might be undefeated in this case can be a pool-
ing equilibrium. For a given q in this range of priors, let the equilibrium under
study be the pooling equilibrium at ep > e∗p(h)). Consider the pooling equilib-
rium that provides the h-types with highest utility e∗p(h) as the alternate sequential
equilibrium. With respect to the ep equilibrium, e∗p(h) is an out of equilibrium
message which is preferred by both types. The e∗p(h) pooling equilibrium has
µ(h|e∗p(h)) = µ(h|e∗p(h)) = q. But, if e∗p(h) is observed, the beliefs in the ep pool-
ing equilibrium assign zero probability to h-types. This inconsistency implies that
the alternate pooling equilibrium defeats the ep pooling equilibrium. Next, let the
equilibrium under study be the pooling equilibrium at ep < e∗p(h)) with pooling
at e∗p(h) again being the alternate equilibrium. It is only the h-types that prefer
the alternate equilibrium over equilibrium under study. But, the ep equilibrium
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will involve µ(h|e∗p(h)) < 1. Thus beliefs at an out of equilibrium message in the
equilibrium under study are inconsistent with the beliefs at this message when it
is an equilibrium message. This inconsistency again leads us to conclude that the
pooling equilibria at ep < e∗p(h) are defeated by the pooling equilibrium at e∗p(h).
Now, let the equilibrium under study be the e∗p(h) pooling equilibrium. Any
pooling equilibrium towards the right of this point can not be a candidate alternate
equilibrium as it is not preferred by either of the types. Pooling equilibria towards
the left of e∗p(h) are only preferred by l-types. Moreover, if any e < e∗p(h) is ob-
served, then the e∗p(h) pooling equilibrium will assign this deviation to the l-types
(by construction, it assigns any deviation from the equilibrium only to l-types).
Thus, the beliefs in the e∗p(h) pooling equilibrium are consistent according to the
undefeated criterion, making it the unique prediction.
The intuitive criterion always selects the Riley separating equilibrium as its
unique predicted outcome. The undefeated criterion selects that equilibrium which
provides the highest payoff to the h-types; the Riley separating equilibrium for low
and medium values of the prior, and the e∗p(h) pooling equilibrium for high values
of the prior.
D. Conclusion
The refinement based on undefeated criterion suggets that when the frequency of
h-type girls is very low, the parents of these girls will try to separate their daughters
from the l-types. When the frequency of h-type girls becomes sufficiently high, h-
type parents make no efforts to separate as the expected value of a girl to men is
very close to the value of h-type girls. The implication of the model that pooling
will take place at increasingly higher levels of confinement as the frequency of
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high type girls increases might seem counterintuitive. However, it might be the
case that the marginal value of confinement as perceived by men is endogenous,
and decreases with an increase in the frequency of high types. This modification
will lead to pooling at lower levels of confinement. A crucial question is how to
determine the prior in a society. Is it a statistic based upon past observations in
the society that can only change with the behavior of the population? Or, can
exogenous factors lead to changes in the prior without affecting the behavioral
patterns? These questions have to be answered before we can see how our model
performs because while comparing the confinement of women across societies we
would have to categorize them according to low, medium, or high prior societies.
The equilibria suggest that under the assumptions of the model parents of
girls can never confine their daughters enough to satisfy the concerns of richest of
men. In our model these men will not even offer proposals to any girl. We interpret
this as suggesting that if they get married they will have an incentive to guard their
wives. This might be the reason for continued confinement of girls married to rich
men when these men do have the option of not doing so.
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CHAPTER III
EVOLUTION OF DIVISION RULES
A. Introduction
...the unjust is what violates the proportion;
for the proportional is intermediate,
and the just is proportional.
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle
The literature on non-cooperative bargaining has primarily focused on the ques-
tion of how agents would divide a given amount of surplus. The simplest game
theoretic representation of the problem is the Nash demand game involving two
agents and certain rules to map demands of agents into payoffs. The multiplicity
of Nash equilibria in the demand game led to the development of the axiomatic ap-
proach (Nash [32], [33]) and extensive form non-cooperative models (Rubinstein
[40]) to select one out of the several Nash equilibria.
The surplus over which bargaining takes place is assumed to be exogenous
in most of the studies. However, even in the most common examples alluded
to in the bargaining literature(landlords and tenants, workers and management),
the surplus is created, and the involved parties have an idea of their claims over
the surplus. This paper deals with situations that could be termed as bargaining
under the shadow of claims. It only deals with those bargaining problems where
the initial claims of both parties are unambiguous and common knowledge, and
the final surplus is not large enough to honor all the initial claims completely. The
simplest example is bargaining among creditors to divide up a bankrupt estate.
The model considered in this paper has two populations of equal size, each
characterized by an exogenous level of claim (cl, ch). Every period N pairs are
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formed with each pair comprising of one low and one high claimant. During each
period, agents in every pair bargain over the same amount e(≤ [cl+ch] = 1) within
the framework of a modified Nash demand game. The agents are assumed to be
myopic best responders, who sometimes exhibit inertia, and sometimes experi-
ment with non-best response strategies. The paper tries to analyze the long run
outcome of this dynamic process. Specifically, it aims to come up with a possible
explanation for the ad hoc division rules (in particular, proportionality) from non-
cooperative bargaining in this evolutionary setting (a framework similar to Young
[46]).
Young [46] embeds the demand game in an evolutionary framework and uti-
lizes the idea of stochastic stability to select the unique long run equilibrium. He
specifies the evolutionary dynamic in a manner that makes the Nash equilibria of
the demand game non-absorbing thereby allowing for transitions among the var-
ious equilibria; and then identifies that Nash equilibrium which, in some sense,
is easy to get to but difficult to escape. Binmore, Samuelson and Young (BSY [7])
clarify the role of the various adaptive dynamics that have been employed in the
literature to model the behavior of agents in evolutionary models of bargaining.
They also provide an alternative way to identify the long run stochastically stable
equilibria. However, Young [46] and BSY [7] assume the surplus to be exogenous
and do not deal with the claims of the involved parties.
Moulin [29] provides an excellent survey of the ad hoc division rules that have
been proposed in the literature to divide an amount of surplus that is no more than
the total amount that went into creating it. The constrained equal awards rule di-
vides the remaining estate equally subject to the constraint that no claimant gets
more than her initial contribution. The most common way of dividing a surplus
that is insufficient to completely satisfy all the (well defined) original contributions
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is to divide it proportionally to the initial contributions. The use of proportional-
ity is widespread in both formal and informal (Ellickson [16]) environments. The
bankruptcy laws of most countries dictate compensating creditors within a partic-
ular priority class proportionally to their initial contributions. The York-Antwerp
Rules guiding maritime commerce have proportionality as the motivation behind
the general average rule that is used to divide the cargo losses suffered during
travel (Knight [26]). The truncated claims proportional rule is derived from the
proportional rule through a simple modification. It first redefines the claim of an
agent to be the minimum of her initial contribution and the size of the estate; and
then divides the estate proportionally to the redefined (truncated) claims.
The existing literature (Aumann and Maschler [3], Thomson [43]) has looked
extensively into the connection between the ad hoc division rules, the axiomatic
and the cooperative bargaining solutions. There exist a few studies that try to
come up with non-cooperative games that will have the division suggested by a
particular ad hoc division rule as the equilibrium. For example, Dagan, Serrano,
and Volij [14] assume that there exists a socially accepted rule to solve claims prob-
lems involving two agents. Under this assumption, they devise a non-cooperative
game involving any finite number of agents which has the n-person generalization
of this bilateral rule as its subgame perfect equilibrium. It is important to note that
they do not answer how the society comes up with the particular bilateral rule.
Ellingsen and Robles [17] and Troeger [45] develop an evolutionary model in
which two agents bargain (in the non-cooperative framework of the Nash demand
game) over a surplus that is created by one agent’s investment. However, they aim
to establish that evolution eliminates the hold up problem. To understand what is
unique about a division rule from a non-cooperative perspective, should we focus
on the ex-ante incentives for investors that a particular rule for dividing the surplus
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would create? Or, should we focus on the bargaining after the surplus is realized; or,
both? Ellingsen and Robles [17] show that efficient investment can be sustained in
the long run even if the ultimatum game (with the investor being the responder)
is used to model the bargaining interaction. Thus, it seems that several rules of
the demand game can lead to efficient investment in the long run. At the same
time, each set of rules for the demand game leads to a different division of the
surplus. Hence, our analysis focuses on the bargaining interaction and assumes
investments to be exogenously given. (It must be emphasized that both Ellingsen
and Robles [17] and Troeger [45] allow only one agent to invest and the return
function is riskless).
Gachter and Riedl [20] report that experimental subjects acting as a third party
allocate the remaining estate (which is less than the sum of initial claims) in propor-
tion to the initial claims. But, when two subjects having different initial claims en-
gage in unstructured anonymous bargaining over the remaining estate, the results
are statistically different from the division that is proportional to initial claims.
This result motivates us to look deeper into the psychological differences that arise
when a person is asked to act as a third party versus when he happens to be a
bargainer himself.
Having considered the results of Troeger [45] and Gachter and Riedl [20], this
paper takes off by first asking: what must be the considerations of a third party
that suggests proportional division of a bankrupt estate; then tries to come up
with the rules for the Nash demand game that reflect these considerations; and
finally establishes the long run prediction of the evolutionary process using these
rules for the demand game. It is shown that several of the ad hoc division rules
can be obtained as the unique long run prediction of the evolutionary model by
suitably changing the rules of the demand game. The reason behind the inability
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to obtain some of the ad hoc rules (that include the proportional rule) as the long
run outcome will be discussed.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the model in detail.
A modified set of rules for the demand give is also given. Section 3 of the paper
illustrates in detail the steps involved in finding out the long run stochastically
stable equilibrium. Section 4 shows the importance of rules of the demand game
in determining the long run outcome. If the agents bargain in the framework of the
usual demand game, the long run stochastically stable equilibrium turns out to be
equal division of the estate. If, in addition to the usual rules, demanding more than
one’s initial claim leads to a zero payoff (claims boundedness) then the long run
equilibrium corresponds to the constrained equal awards rule. If the rules further
specify that agents will obtain positive payoffs only if the sum of their demands
equals the estate size (efficiency), then the long run divisions are those prescribed
by the truncated claims proportional rule
To motivate the analysis in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, suppose we ask a person to
act as a third party and divide an amount e ≤ 1 between two agents who had
initially contributed cl = 0.4, and ch = 0.6. Two things will most likely be observed.
First, the division proposed by the third party will never give any agent more
than her initial contribution for any e ≤ 1. For example, if e = 0.9, no person
acting as a neutral third party will violate claims boundedness (i.e., suggest giving
the low (high) claimant more than 0.4(0.6)). Second, the proposed divisions will
be efficient (for example, the third party is unlikely to suggest the division [0.4, 0.4]
for e = 0.9, and let the remaining amount go waste). Instead of asking why third
parties behave in this manner, the paper takes these two presumptions as helpful
cues to come up with the rules that should be used to structure the bargaining
between the two agents.
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The rules that capture both efficiency and claims boundedness lead to the
emergence of truncated-proportional division as the unique long run outcome. Con-
sider the case with (cl, ch, e) = (0.4, 0.6, 0.5). The maximum feasible payoff to the
high claimant is e = 0.5, and she will end up losing atleast [ch −min(ch, e)] = 0.1.
This is referred to as the sunk claim as it is beyond recovery. The equilibrium di-
vision turns out to be as if the claims of agents have been truncated from cj to
min(cj, e), and then the estate is being divided proportionally to these truncated
claims.
The emergence of truncated-proportionality clarifies the reason behind the fail-
ure to obtain exact-proportionality as the long run outcome within this framework.
This framework disregards claims that become sunk. On the other hand, propor-
tionality requires dividing the leftover estate in proportion to the original contribu-
tions, even when a part of the contribution is beyond recovery for one or both the
agents. It is only when the remaining estate is large enough to feasibly compensate
even the high claimant, that exact-proportionality is the stochastically stable long
run equilibrium.
B. The Model
The model considers a family of economies with each economy indexed by the
tuple (cl, ch, e), where e ≤ (cl + ch) = 1. Each economy in this family is assumed
to consist of two distinct populations (low claimants and high claimants). The size
of each population is N. Each bargaining pair consists of a L-claimant and a H-
claimant. The decision of agents regarding whether to contribute, and if so how
much, is not modeled explicitly. Only one level of investment for each population
is considered. In every pair the low (high) claimant is assumed to have contributed
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cl (ch). The agents come together in the form of a bargaining pair only after the
realization of bankruptcy to decide upon the division of the remaining estate. It is
assumed that for every pair during each time period in a particular economy, the
size of the pie that remains after bankruptcy equals e ∈ (0, 1]. Thus, in a particular
economy (belonging to the family) cl, ch, and e take the same numerical values
across all pairs for all time periods. For example, there will be an economy in the
family with (cl, ch, e) = (0.4, 0.6, 0.5). So, in this economy during each time period
N pairs are formed with the low (high) claimant in each pair having contributed
0.4 (0.6). Every such pair during each time period has to decide how to divide 0.5.
The interest lies in figuring out the unique long run division that will emerge in
each economy in the family, and then comparing them to the ad hoc division rules
for claims problems.
A seemingly serious drawback of the set up is the assumption of fixed values
of cl, ch, and e for a particular economy, irrespective of pairings and time. The
first move towards greater realism might be to let e vary. However, if we allow
e to take different values, then there will be no simple way of specifying the best
response dynamic. For example, let (cl, ch) = (0.4, 0.6) for all pairs at all times in
an economy; but let e take two values 0.5 or 0.9. Should the two agents in a pair
that are bargaining over e = 0.5 during the current period be allowed to draw
inferences from the past play in cases with e = 0.9? If not, and players respond
only according to the plays in the previous period that had e = 0.5, then allowing
for two values of e does not help in any way. Troeger [45] takes this route when
he assumes that agents in a pair state their current optimal demands by consulting
the distribution of past demands in only those cases that had the same amount of
surplus to be divided as this pair has in the current period. (This question does not
even arise in Young [46] and BSY [7] as the bargaining always takes place over one
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unit of exogenously given surplus). Unfortunately, it is very difficult to model the
other case where we wish to allow agents to best respond to all the observed cases.
Thus, the assumption of fixed values of cl, ch, and e for a particular economy is
partly for innocuous convenience and partly because of the lack of a simple theory
to model learning across similar (but not the same) situations.
The bargaining interaction of a pair is modeled as a modified Nash demand
game– the blame game. The demand game involves the two agents in a pair stat-
ing their demands simultaneously. The rules of the game specify what happens
in case the sum of demands does or does not exceed the pie to be divided. The
usual specification involves the agents being awarded their demands in case the
sum of their demands does not exceed the pie, and the agents obtaining nothing
if the sum of their demands exceeds the pie. Let dl (dh) be the demand of the low
(high) claimant, and xl (xh) be her payoff. Demands greater than e are ruled out.
The rules of the blame game try to capture the fact that the bargainers have well
defined initial contributions. The rules are first described in words and then de-
fined formally.
1) The agents are awarded their demands in case the sum of their demands does
not exceed e.
2) If sum of the demands exceeds e, then two cases have to be considered.
a) If both agents demand more or both demand less than their original
contributions, then both get zero. This reflects the thought that we can
not pin down the responsibility for the sum of demands exceeding the
estate size on either agent.
b) If one demands more than her claim and the other less than her claim,
then the former receives zero and the latter receives her demand.
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(xl, xh) =

(dl, dh) if dl + dh ≤ e
(0, 0) if dl + dh > e, dl > cl, dh > ch
(0, 0) if dl + dh > e, dl ≤ cl, dh ≤ ch
(dl, 0) if dl + dh > e, dl ≤ cl, dh > ch
(0, dh) if dl + dh > e, dl > cl, dh ≤ ch
(3.1)
Pairs of demands of the form (d∗l , d
∗
h) = (d
∗
l , e− d∗l ) that completely exhaust the pie
constitute the Nash equilibria. Let D∗l denote the range of equilibrium payoffs to
the low-claimant. Formally,
d∗l ∈ D∗l =

[0, e] if e ≤ cl
[0, cl] if cl < e ≤ ch
[e− ch, cl] if ch < e
(3.2)
The minimum equilibrium payoff to the lower claimant is the remainder that will
be left if the higher claimant is fully compensated, subject to the constraint that it
should be positive. Similarly, the maximum payoff to the lower claimant equals
her original contribution, subject to the constraint that e > cl. This reveals that the
equilibria of the modified demand game incorporate some elements of forward
induction type of reasoning. The general expression is
d∗l ∈ D∗l = [(D∗l )min, (D∗l )max] = [max(0, e− ch), min(e, cl)] (3.3)
and
d∗h = (e− d∗l ) (3.4)
In a one shot interaction the modified Nash demand game has multiple pure strat-
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egy Nash equilibria 1with the equilibrium payoff to the low claimant varying from
(D∗l )min = max(0, e− ch) to (D∗l )max = min(e, cl). The technique developed by Fos-
ter and Young [18] is utilized to find the stochastically stable equilibria. In order to
do so several assumptions have to be made which are described next.
1. The Unperturbed Dynamic
The agents make their demands from the discrete and finite set [δ, 2δ, . . . , e−δ] hav-
ing cardinality K (assuming e = (K + 1)δ), where δ can be thought of as the least
count of the monetary scale used in the economy. With a discrete strategy space,
any efficient division of e will be of the form ((K + 1 − k)δ, kδ), where k ∈ [1, K].
An efficient division ((K + 1 − k)δ, kδ) that happens to be a Nash equilibrium of
the blame game will be referred to as the k-equilibrium. The low (high) claimants
will be relatively better off in an equilibrium with low (high) value of k. Evolution
of the process occurs in discrete time. Assuming both populations are of equal
size N , in each time period N random bargaining pairs consisting of a high and
a low claimant will be formed. Each pair has complete knowledge of the origi-
nal contributions, and faces the same problem of dividing e within the framework
of the modified demand game. The state at the end of period t is st = (nl, nh)t,
where nj is a K dimensional vector representing the number of agents in popula-
tion j ∈ (L,H) playing the pure strategy k ∈ [1, K]. The unperturbed adjustment
dynamic is assumed to be the best response dynamic such that the current period
demand of every agent maximizes her expected payoff given the previous period
distribution of demands in the opponents’ population. This dynamic specification
1It is only when e = 1 that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium for the one
shot game with each agent demanding her original contribution, a result that mo-
tivated the choice of rules for the demand game.
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can be concisely represented as a Markov chain M(0,0) on the finite state space S
consisting of all pairs s = (nl, nh) ∈ RK × RK , with ∑nlk = ∑nhk = N . The tran-
sition matrix for the process is denoted by T(0,0) = [pij], where pij is the probability
that the process lands in state i at time (t + 1) given it was in state j at time t. The
process is time homogeneous as the transition probabilities do not depend on time.
Restricting the demands of the agents to the finite set [δ, 2δ, . . . , e − δ] allows
us to proceed with the calculation of the stochastically stable equilibria by making
the underlying Markov chain, M(0,0), finite. It also ensures that the best response
of agents in the blame game will be a function and not a correspondence. Best
response functions are more likely to lead to singleton absorbing sets for M(0,0)
thereby resulting in the blame game being weakly acyclic.
The best response behavior of agents has at least two unpleasant implications
regarding the evolution of the process, given the motivation of this study. First,
suppose the process starts with all low claimants playing the same pure strategy
k, and all high claimants playing the same pure strategy k‘, with k 6= (K + 1− k‘).
Given this initial state, under the best response dynamic, the process will keep
cycling and the two populations will end up mis-coordinating for ever. Second,
the pure strategy strict Nash equilibria will be recurrent states as the probability
that the process returns to this state at some time in future, given that it is (or, was)
in this state, is unity. Our interest lies in the long run behavior summarized by the
stationary probability distribution over states. A probability distribution over the
states is stationary if, once realized at some time, the probability distribution over
states at all subsequent times remains the same. Since the recurrent class is not
unique, the stationary distribution depends on the initial state. Let v(0,0)(s|s0) be
the relative frequency of the occurrence of state s till time t, given the initial state
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is s0. Then,
lim
t→∞
v(0,0)(s|s0) = µ(0,0)(s|s0) (3.5)
In other words, the process is non-ergodic and can converge to any of the sev-
eral pure strategy Nash equilibria 2 depending on the initial state, and once the
process reaches any such state it gets stuck there. As a result, issues pertaining to
equilibrium selection in the long run can not be addressed. Both of these prob-
lems (perpetual mis-coordination and initial state dependence) can be eliminated
if deviations from best response behavior on part of the agents are introduced.
2. The Perturbed Dynamic
Following BSY [7], a perturbed best response dynamic is defined that first incor-
porates inertia to eliminate continual mis-coordination; and then allows the agents
to play experimental non-best response strategies to overcome initial state depen-
dence of the long run outcome. Let the probability that an agent states the same
demand as in the previous period be λ ∈ (0, 1), and the probability with which
she best responds be (1− λ). We can now define the time homogeneous transition
matrix T(λ,0). It can be proved that there always exists a λmin ∈ (0, 1) that will get
rid of the perpetual mis-coordination. When inertia is added to the best response
dynamic the blame game becomes weakly acyclic. In other words, only the pure
strategy Nash equilibria [47] will be the absorbing sets 3 of M(λ,0). Intuitively, even
a small amount of inertia breaks the cycle of mis-coordination by moving the state
2If there exist absorbing sets that are not singletons, then it is also possible that
the process reaches an absorbing set without actually converging to a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium.
3Since the absorbing sets are singletons, we can now refer to them as the ab-
sorbing states
39
from the corners to the interior of the state space. The process will be aperiodic but
not irreducible for all λ ∈ (0, 1). As every Nash equilibrium is still an absorbing
state, the stationary distribution still depends on the initial state, and no meaning-
ful discussion of equilibrium selection is as yet possible. Formally,
lim
t→∞
v(λ,0)(s|s0) = µ(λ,0)(s|s0) (3.6)
To make the Nash equilibria non-absorbing it is further assumed that when an
agent goes on to state a demand that is different from the one in previous period,
then she experiments with probability ² > 0. While experimenting, the agent is
equally likely to state any demand from the feasible set. Thus, in each period an
agent responds inertially with probability λ, plays a best response with probability
(1 − λ)(1 − ²), and engages in random experimentation with probability (1 − λ)².
The time homogeneous transition matrix for the resulting process is denoted by
T(λ,²).
The strategies an agent is allowed to play while experimenting might alter the
equilibrium that will be selected as the (ultra) long run outcome. If the experimen-
tal strategies are chosen at random from the set of feasible strategies then every
state is accessible from every other state in a finite number of periods. The process
becomes irreducible, with the unique recurrent class being the whole state space.
Also, the process is aperiodic because there does not exist any state to which the
process will continually return with a fixed time period (greater than one). This
helps us in two ways. Irreducibility implies that the process can potentially escape
even a Nash equilibrium because in presence of experimentation Nash equilibria
cease to be the absorbing states. Irreducibility, together with aperiodicity, implies
that the stationary probability distribution over states will be unique and indepen-
dent of the initial state.
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It might be reasonable to assume that agents engage in state dependent ex-
perimentation. If agents experiment rationally then they will never play a strat-
egy which (if established as the equilibrium) would give them a lower payoff
than what they obtain in the currently established equilibrium. The time homo-
geneous transition matrix for this specification will be denoted by T(λ,²R). This
process is aperiodic but we do need to argue that it is irreducible. Recall that the
low claimants receive their maximum payoff in the 1-equilibrium, and the high
claimants receive their maximum payoff in the K-equilibrium. Suppose, the pro-
cess is in the k-equilibrium at time t, with 1 < k < K. There is a positive probabil-
ity that all low (high) claimants rationally experiment in period (t + 1) by playing
the strategy 1 (K) which (if established as the equilibrium) will provide them their
maximum possible payoff. Now, in period (t+2) there will be a positive probability
that all agents in both populations best respond. This will lead each low claimant
to play strategy K, and each high claimant to play strategy 1. At this point agents
in both populations are playing their minimum payoff strategies. With rational
experimentation, every state now becomes accessible. Thus, even with rational
experimentation the process is irreducible for every ² > 0 and will have a unique
stationary distribution that is independent of the initial state. However, the two
stationary distributions can be different. Formally,
lim
t→∞
v(λ,²)(s|s0) = µ(λ,²)(s) (3.7)
lim
t→∞
v(λ,²R)(s|s0) = µ(λ,²R)(s) (3.8)
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3. Stochastic Stability
Stochastic stability relates to the limit of the stationary distribution as the proba-
bility of experimentation goes to zero. The state s is stochastically stable if
lim
²→0
µ(λ,²)(s) > 0 (3.9)
The stochastically stable states are those that are most likely to be observed in the
long run as experimental play by agents becomes exceedingly rare. The states that
can be reached via experimental play by few agents, but escaped only if a large
number of agents experiment, are the prime candidates for being the stochasti-
cally stable states. The predictive power of the analysis is greater the fewer is the
number of states that receive positive probability weight under the above limit.
The algorithm for identifying the stochastically stable states first requires cal-
culating the stationary distribution of the process for an arbitrary ² > 0, and then
finding the states that receive positive probability weight as ² approaches zero.
The limiting operation is easy but the usual technique for calculating the station-
ary distribution is very cumbersome if the state space is large as it involves solving
a huge system of equations.
The next section begins with some useful definitions from graph theory and
describes how to identify the stochastically stable state(s) in a relatively straight-
forward manner using directed graphs (Friedlin and Wentzell [19], Young [46] and
[47]).
4. The Minimal Tree
A graph comprises of two types of elements: nodes and edges. An edge connects
a pair of nodes. A graph in which the edges have a sense of direction are called
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directed graphs. A path is a collection of alternate nodes and edges such that
each node in this collection is incident to a minimum of zero and a maximum of
two edges in this collection. The (in) out-degree of a node is the number of edges
directed (in) out-ward at the node. A path in which all the interior nodes have in
and out degree of one is called a directed path. A node is reachable from some
other node in the graph if there is a directed path that starts at the latter and ends
at the former. A cycle in a graph is a collection of alternate nodes and edges such
that each node in this collection has in and out degree of one. A graph is acyclic
if it contains no cycles, and unicyclic if it contains exactly one cycle. The graph is
connected if it is possible to establish a path from any node to any other node in
the graph. A tree is a connected acyclic graph. Rooted trees are directed acyclic
graphs with (|S| − 1) edges such that each edge is directed towards the root node,
and from every node there is one and only one directed path to the root node.
However, there can be several trees rooted at the same node. A weighted graph
associates a real number with every edge in the graph. The weight of a path in a
weighted graph is the sum of the weights of the edges in the path.
Let G0 be the complete directed graph constructed by using each of the K ab-
sorbing states (i.e., each of the pure strategy Nash equilibria) of the time homoge-
nous Markov chain M(0,0) as a node. The weight on the directed edge (k → k‘) is
taken to be the minimum number of experimenting agents required to move the
process from the k-equilibrium to the k‘-equilibrium, often referred to as the resis-
tance of this transition. Consider any one of the trees rooted at node k ∈ [1, K].
It will feature a directed path having K − 1 directed edges. The resistance of this
rooted tree is defined as the sum of the resistances of the edges along its path. The
resistance of each tree, rooted at each of the K nodes, can be calculated in a similar
manner. Let Γ0 represent the collection of all the trees in G0. The stochastically
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stable state(s) is the one that serves as the root of the tree having minimal resis-
tance (the minimal tree) among all the rooted trees in Γ0 (Friedlin and Wentzell,
[19]). However, if K is large then figuring out the minimal tree by explicitly cal-
culating the resistance of each rooted tree becomes very tedious. The following
section relies heavily on Young [47] and BSY [7] in establishing that the stochasti-
cally stable division of a bankrupt estate corresponds to the divisions proposed by
the constrained equal awards rule, if the underlying interaction is assumed to be
the blame game described in Section 2.
C. The Long Run Equilibrium
It has been argued in the previous section that the absorbing sets of M(λ,0) are sin-
gletons. This implies that M(λ,0) satisfies the no cycling condition (BSY [7]). Since
every finite time-homogenous process reaches an absorbing set, M(λ,0) will even-
tually reach a Nash equilibrium, as only the Nash equilibria are the (singleton)
absorbing sets of M(λ,0). Since we are only interested in identifying the stochasti-
cally stable equilibria we need to focus solely on M(λ,²) as ² tends to zero. This in
turn implies that the minimal tree will be rooted at a Nash equilibrium. Hence, all
we need to do is to find the tree rooted at a Nash equilibrium that has minimum
total resistance. Those Nash equilibria that serve as the root of the trees having
minimum total resistance will be the stochastically stable states of M(λ,²).
The equilibria of the blame game have been illustrated at the beginning of
Section 2 for continuous strategy space. When the strategy space is discrete and
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demands are restricted to lie between δ and (e− δ), the Nash equilibria are
d∗l ∈ D∗l =

[δ, e− δ] if e ≤ cl
[δ, cl] if cl < e ≤ ch
[e− ch, cl] if ch < e
(3.10)
Recall that d∗l denotes an equilibrium payoff to the low claimant, and D
∗
l denotes
the set of equilibrium payoffs to the low claimant in the blame game.
In the following discussion only those strategies that are integral multiples of
δ will be considered. Suppose, the process is currently in the equilibrium (x, e−x).
Let
X+ = [d∗l : d
∗
l > x] and X
− = [d∗l : d
∗
l < x] (3.11)
Thus, x+ ∈ X+ represents an equilibrium payoff to the lower claimant higher than
x. The interest lies in figuring out the equilibrium that is most easily accessible
from the current equilibrium at x. This most likely transition can either be on
the left or on the right of x. We separately figure out the most easily accessible
equilibrium to the right of x, and the most easily accessible equilibrium to the left
of x. The easier of these two will in turn be termed as the most easily accessible
equilibrium from the equilibrium at x. The relevant 2 × 2 games that need to be
considered are shown in Figure 1. The game labeled x+ > x has two pure strategy
Nash equilibria: (x, e − x) and (x+, e − x+). Suppose the economy is currently in
the equilibrium (x, e − x). The equilibrium (x+, e − x+) can emerge if a sufficient
number of L-claimants experiment with the higher demand of x+. The 2× 2 game
helps us calculate the fraction of agents in the L-population that should randomly
experiment with the higher demand of x+ such that the best response for agents in
the H-population is to demand e− x+.
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Fig. 1. The relevant games
Let fl[x → x+] denote the minimum fraction of L-agents that need to experi-
ment and demand x+ > x such that the best response for H-agents is to demand
(e− x+). Formally,
fl.(e− x+) + (1− fl).(e− x+) = fl.0 + (1− fl).(e− x) (3.12)
⇒ fl[x→ x+] = x
+ − x
e− x (3.13)
Similarly, let fh[(e− x)→ (e− x+)] denote the minimum fraction of H-agents that
will have to experiment with (e− x+) such that the best response for L-agents is to
demand x+. We have
fh.x
− + (1− fh).x− = fh.0 + (1− fh).x (3.14)
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⇒ fh[(e− x)→ (e− x+)] = x
x+
(3.15)
1. The Transition (x→ x+)
The main proposition is arrived at through a sequence of simple results. Let (x+l , e−
x+l ) be the equilibrium towards the right of x that is most easily accessible as a re-
sult of experiments initiated by agents in the L-population. Then
Result 1(a) The least costly transition initiated by L-claimants towards x+ > x is the
local transition. This is because
x+l = argminx+ fl[x→ x+] = argminx+ (
x+ − x
e− x )
⇒ x+l = (x+)min = (x+ δ) (3.16)
Result 1(b) The resistance to the most likely transition towards x+ > x initiated by
experiments on part of L-claimants is
fl[x→ x+l ] =
δ
e− x (3.17)
Result 2(a) The least costly transition initiated by H-claimants towards x+ > x is the
extreme transition. This is because
x+h = argminx+ fh[(e− x)→ (e− x+)] = argminx+ (
x
x+
)
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⇒ x+h = (x+)max =

e− δ if e ≤ cl
cl if e > cl
(3.18)
Result 2(b) The resistance to the most likely transition towards x+ > x initiated by
experiments of H-claimants is
fh[(e− x)→ (e− x+h )] =

x
e−δ if e ≤ cl
x
cl
if e > cl
(3.19)
Result 3(a) The most likely transition from the equilibrium at x towards the right will
be to the equilibrium at x++, where
x++ =

x+ δ if fl[x→ x+l ] ≤ fh[(e− x)→ (e− x+h )]
e− δ if fl[x→ x+l ] > fh[(e− x)→ (e− x+h )] & e ≤ cl
cl if fl[x→ x+l ] > fh[(e− x)→ (e− x+h )] & e > cl
(3.20)
Result 3(b) The resistance for the least costly transition for the equilibrium at x will be
r+(x) =

δ
e−x if fl[x→ x+l ] ≤ fh[(e− x)→ (e− x+h )]
x
e−δ if fl[x→ x+l ] > fh[(e− x)→ (e− x+h )] & e ≤ cl
x
cl
if fl[x→ x+l ] > fh[(e− x)→ (e− x+h )] & e > cl
(3.21)
Result 4 The least costly transition towards the right will be the local transition initiated
by experiments of L-agents.
For this result to be true it has to be proved that the most likely transition to-
wards the right of any established equilibrium which is initiated by experiments
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of L-claimants requires less number of experimenting agents than the most likely
transition initiated by H-claimants. Formally, we require
fl[x→ x+l ] ≤ fh[(e− x)→ (e− x+h )]⇒

x(e− x) ≥ δ(e− δ) if e ≤ cl
x(e− x) ≥ δcl if e > cl
(3.22)
It can be easily verified that both these inequalities hold true. The term [x(e − x)]
is the Nash product at the current equilibrium (x, e − x). If e ≤ cl, the minimum
value of Nash product [δ(e− δ)] occurs when d∗l is δ, or e− δ. Hence, x(e− x) will
not be less than δ(e−δ) if e ≤ cl. If e > cl, then x(e−x) ≥ δ(e−δ) ≥ δcl. The second
part of this inequality holds because e− δ ≥ cl. The first part holds because δ(e− δ)
is the minimum value of the Nash product. This completes the proof of Result 4.
2. The Transition (x− ← x)
The procedure for calculating the equilibrium towards the left of the current equi-
librium x that requires fewest experiments is the same. Calculations show that
fl[x
− ← x] = ( e− x
e− x− ) (3.23)
fh[(e− x−)← (e− x)] = (x− x
−
x
) (3.24)
Result 5 The least costly transition initiated by L-claimants towards x− < x is the jump
to the left most extreme. This is because
x−l = argminx− fl[x
− ← x] = argminx− ( e− x
e− x− )
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⇒ x−l = (x−)min =

δ if e ≤ ch
e− ch if e > ch
(3.25)
Result 6 The least costly transition initiated by H-claimants towards x− < x is the local
transition to (x− δ). This holds because
x−h = argminx− fh[(e− x−)← (e− x)] = argminx− (
x− x−
x
)
⇒ x−h = (x−)max = (x− δ) (3.26)
Result 7 The least costly transition from any equilibrium x towards the left will be the
local transition initiated by the experiments of H-claimants.
To establish this result it has to be proved that fh[(e− x−)← (e− x)] ≤ fl[x−l ← x].
Note that
fh[(e− x−)← (e− x)] ≤ fl[x−l ← x]⇒

x(e− x) ≥ δ(e− δ) if e ≤ ch
x(e− x) ≥ δch if e > ch
(3.27)
The two inequalities indeed hold true as can be easily verified. The most likely
transition towards left is again the local transition. However, it is initiated by the
experiments of H-claimants. The resistance for moving from any equilibrium to-
wards the most easily accessible equilibrium on left thus becomes
r−(x) =
δ
x
(3.28)
Result 8 It is easily verified that r+(x) is monotonically increasing in x, and r−(x) is
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monotonically decreasing in x. r+(x) < r−(x) for all x that support a Nash equilibrium
if e > 2cl. r+ intersects r−(x) at 12e if e ≤ 2cl. From an existing equilibrium x the least
costly transition is to the equilibrium at (x+ (−)δ) if r+(x) < (>) r−(x).
Proposition 1 The stochastically stable equilibrium corresponds to the constrained equal
awards rule if bargaining among the claimants takes place under the rules of the blame
game .
The minimal tree is given by the lower envelope of [r+(x), r−(x)]when all least cost
transitions are local (Young [47]). This minimal tree is rooted at 1
2
e or cl depending
upon whether e is smaller or greater than 2cl. The constrained equal awards rule
divides the estate equally subject to the constraint that no claimant gets more than
her original contribution. Both agents get half of the estate if the estate is less than
2cl; the low claimant gets cl if the estate is more than 2cl. Hence, the stochastically
stable equilibrium exactly corresponds to the constrained equal awards rule. If we
only allow for rational experimentation by agents then all transitions that involve
a jump to an extreme will apriori be ruled out. However, the stochastically sta-
ble equilibrium remains unchanged as the least costly transitions for the demand
game considered in this section always happen to be the local transitions initiated
by rational experiments.
It is worth noting that Proposition 1 can also be obtained by a different choice
of rules for the demand game. Consider the usual Nash demand game. Suppose,
we add to it the rule that an agent demanding more than her initial contribution
gets nothing, irrespective of the demand of her opponent. This can be interpreted
as imposing claims boundedness on the final payoffs. The reader can verify that
the Nash equilibria of the one shot demand game that imposes claims boundedness
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to the usual demand game are the same as those of the blame game. This gives us
the following corollary to Proposition 1.
Corollary 1 The stochastically stable equilibrium corresponds to the constrained equal
awards rule if the requirement of claims boundedness is added to the rules of the usual
Nash demand game.
D. Importance of Rules of the Demand Game
The rules of the demand game determine the payoffs resulting from the demands
of agents and consequentially affect the analysis in two important ways. First, the
rules determine the set of Nash equilibria of the one-shot demand game. Second,
they bear upon the criterion that determines the most likely transition from an es-
tablished equilibrium. This section analyzes the long run behavior of the process
under some reasonable rules of the demand game. First the usual demand game
is considered, and then the rules are modified to incorporate the idea of efficiency
and claims boundedness as discussed in Section 1.
1. The Usual Demand Game
Let us consider the same basic set up as in the previous section with the only
change being that the rules of the underlying game are those used in the usual
Nash demand game.
1) Agents are awarded their demands if the sum of their demands does not
exceed e.
2) They obtain nothing if the sum of their demands exceeds e.
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For any e ∈ (δ, 1], the Nash equilibrium strategy vector will be of the form
(x, e− x) = (d∗l , d∗h) = (d∗l , e− d∗l ), where d∗l ∈ [δ, e− δ]. The search for the minimal
tree will involve the consideration of exactly the same two games shown in Figure
1. The analysis is much easier because the equilibrium payoffs to the agents no
longer vary with the value of e in relation to cl and ch. Note that the minimum
value of the nash product will be [δ(e − δ)], at x = δ, and (e − δ). Thus, the nash
product at any x ∈ [2δ, e−2δ] will be greater than the Nash product at the extremes.
This leads to the following simple result.
Result Local transitions initiated by rational experiments are least costly. Formally,
x(e− x) ≥ δ(e− δ)⇒ fl[x→ x+l ] ≤ fh[(e− x)→ (e− x+h )]
⇒ x++ = (x+ δ) and r+(x) = δ
e− x (3.29)
Similarly,
x(e− x) ≥ δ(e− δ)⇒ fh[(e− x)← (e− x−h )] ≤ fl[x← x−l ]
⇒ x−− = (x− δ) and r−(x) = δ
x
(3.30)
Proposition 2 Equal division is the stochastically stable equilibrium if we employ the
rules of the usual demand game.
The lower envelope of [r+(x), r−(x)] gives the minimal tree, and the intersection
of the two curves (if it exists) serves as root of the minimal tree since all least cost
transitions are local. The minimal tree is rooted at 1
2
e, and thus equal division is
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the stochastically stable equilibrium. This is because
r+(x) = r−(x) ⇒ δ
e− xss =
δ
xss
⇒ xss = 1
2
e (3.31)
2. Efficiency
Within the same dynamic framework, now consider the following rules for the de-
mand game.
1) Agents are awarded their demands if the sum of demands equals e.
2) They obtain nothing if the sum of demands exceeds or falls short of e.
It is straightforward to see that the Nash equilibria of this demand game in a one-
shot interaction will be of the form (d∗l , e − d∗l ). Since all the off-diagonal payoffs
are zero, we will have to redo the analysis for identifying the stochastically stable
equilibrium by considering the two games shown in Figure 2. All the notations
carry the same meaning as in Section 3. We have
fl[x→ x+] = (e− x)
(e− x) + (e− x+) ⇒ x
+
l = (x
+)min = (x+ δ) (3.32)
fh[x→ x+] = x
x+ x+
⇒ x+h = (x+)max = (e− δ) (3.33)
The least costly transition from any x towards the right will be the transition to the
extreme right initiated by the H-claimants experimenting with their lowest payoff
strategy. This is because fl[x→ x+l ] ≥ fh[x→ x+h ], for all x ∈ [δ, e− δ].
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Fig. 2. The relevant games with efficiency
Similar calculations for the transitions towards left of x give
fl[x
− ← x] = (e− x)
(e− x) + (e− x−) ⇒ x
−
l = (x
−)min = δ (3.34)
fh[x
− ← x] = x
x+ x−
⇒ x−h = (x−)max = (x− δ) (3.35)
The least costly transition from any x towards the left will be the transition to the
extreme left initiated by the L-claimants experimenting with their lowest payoff
strategy. This is because fl[x → x−l ] < fh[x → x−h ], for all x ∈ [δ, e − δ]. Thus, the
resistance functions are
r+(x) =
x
x+ (x+)max
=
x
x+ (e− δ) (3.36)
r−(x) =
(e− x)
(e− x) + (e− (x−)min) =
(e− x)
(e− x) + (e− δ) (3.37)
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Given an existing equilibrium at x, the least costly transition will be to the equilib-
rium on extreme right if
r+(x) ≤ r−(x)⇒ x
(x+)max
≤ (e− x)
(e− (x−)min) =
(e− x)
(e− x)max (3.38)
The kalai-Smorodinsky solution for this bargaining problem would be the payoff
vector (xks, e− xks), such that
xks
xmax
=
(e− xks)
(e− x)max (3.39)
Thus, if the existing equilibrium provides the low claimant a payoff lower (higher)
than what she would get in the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, then the least costly
transition will be to the equilibrium on extreme right (left). It is clear from the
above calculations that r+(x) and r−(x) intersect at xks. We might be tempted to
conclude that the lower envelope of [r+(x), r−(x)] gives the minimal tree which
in turn is rooted at xks, and thus the stochastically stable equilibrium should be
(xks, e − xks) = (12e, 12e). It was mentioned earlier that this reasoning is applicable
only when the least costly transitions are local. However, Proposition 10 of BSY [7]
tells us that the stochastically stable equilibrium is indeed (xks, e− xks) = (12e, 12e).
The result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Equal division of the bankrupt estate is the stochastically stable equilib-
rium if the rules of the demand game ask for efficiency.
3. Efficiency and Claims Boundedness
Efficiency alone is not enough for proportionality to emerge. Consider the follow-
ing set of rules that are designed to capture both claims boundedness and effi-
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ciency.
(xl, xh) =

(dl, dh) if dl + dh = e
(dl, 0) if dl + dh = e, dl ≤ cl, dh > ch
(0, dh) if dl + dh = e, dl > cl, dh ≤ ch
(0, 0) if dl + dh 6= e
(3.40)
The set of Nash equilibria will consist of some allocations in which one agent gets
zero payoff. Since such equilibria will be trivially easy to escape, stochastic sta-
bility calculations will be unaffected if these equilibria are ignored. The subset of
Nash equilibria with strictly positive payoffs to the low claimants are given by
d∗l ∈

[δ, e− δ] if e ≤ cl
[δ, cl] if cl < e ≤ ch
[e− ch, cl] if ch < e
(3.41)
The relevant games that need to be considered are again those illustrated in Figure
2. Following the same procedure and using the same notations we have
fl[x→ x+] = (e− x)
(e− x) + (e− x+) ⇒ x
+
l = (x
+)min = (x+ δ) (3.42)
fh[x→ x+] = x
x+ x+
⇒ x+h = (x+)max =

e− δ if e ≤ cl
cl if cl < e
(3.43)
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Similarly,
fl[x
− ← x] = (e− x)
(e− x) + (e− x−) ⇒ x
−
l = (x
−)min =

δ if e ≤ ch
e− ch if ch < e
(3.44)
fh[x
− ← x] = x
x+ x−
⇒ x−h = (x−)max = (x− δ) (3.45)
It turns out that from any x the most likely transitions in either direction are the
extreme transitions for all possible cases. Formally, fl[x → x+l ] ≥ fh[x → x+h ] and
fh[x
−
h ← x] ≥ fl[x−l ← x]
This further implies that the resistances take the same form as in the previous case.
It was established in the previous case that from any established equilibrium at
x the most likely transition will be to the extreme right (left) if the low claimants
are receiving a lower (higher) payoff than suggested by the kalai-Smorodinsky
solution. The Kalai-Smorodinsky division, which will also be the stochastically
stable equilibrium, is
(xssl , x
ss
h ) =

(1
2
e, 1
2
e) if e ≤ cl
([ cl
cl+e
]e, [ e
cl+e
]e) if cl < e ≤ cl
(cle, che) if ch < e
(3.46)
The stochastically stable equilibria exactly correspond to the truncated claims pro-
portional rule. This rule first truncates the claim of each agent from cj to min(cj, e);
and then divides the estate proportionally to the truncated claims. This result in
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 The division suggested by the truncated claims proportional rule is the
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stochastically stable equilibrium if the rules of the demand game require both efficiency and
claims boundedness.
4. Why Not Proportional?
The results obtained in the previous section help us understand why the propor-
tional division does not emerge as the stochastically stable equilibrium. For ease
of exposition let us consider an example with cl = 0.4, ch = 0.6, and e = 0.5. Since
ch > e, the high claimant will definitely end up loosing the amount of (ch − e),
henceforth referred to as the sunk claim. (It is easy to see that one, both, or none of
the agents might have some sunk claims depending on the particular values of cl,
ch, and e). If we consider this particular set of values then the proportional divi-
sion would be (2, 3). The usual demand game (Section 3.3), the modified demand
game (Section 3.1-2), and the demand game requiring absolute efficiency (Section
4.1) will predict (2.5, 2.5) as the stable division. The demand game requiring both
absolute efficiency and claims boundedness (Section 4.2) will predict (20
9
, 25
9
).
In all the formulations of the demand game the agents were restricted to de-
mand no more than e, for obvious reasons. Irrespective of the rules of the demand
game, that part of an agent’s claim which is sunk will never figure in the calcula-
tions. However, as discussed earlier, when someone is asked to act as a third party
his prescriptions will, in all likelihood, satisfy claims boundedness. More impor-
tantly, there is nothing to prevent this third party from giving serious thought to
the original contribution of the high claimant (0.6), and not just the maximum fea-
sible payoff satisfying claims boundedness (min(0.6, 0.5) = 0.5). This suggests the
following conjecture.
Conjecture 1 An ad hoc division rule that uses the initial claims of agents while dividing
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the estate can not be obtained as the unique stochastically stable equilibrium by any choice
of rules for the demand game.
Most of the the division rules truncate the claims from cj to min(cj, e), either
directly or indirectly. It is transparent that even if some cj > e, the proportional
rule still uses the original contributions (ch, cl) to divide the remaining estate. This
implies that the proportional rule does take into account the sunk claims which in
turn makes it impossible to obtain it as the stochastically stable equilibrium in the
evolutionary framework of this paper. It can not be denied that proportional di-
vision possesses certain properties that make it very attractive.For example, using
proportional division ensures that there is no benefit to an agent from splitting her
claim into several smaller claims, or merging her claim with the claims of other
agents (Moulin [29]). However, this transfer-proofness of proportional division
rule is vacuous when there are only two claimants.
E. Conclusion
The main question the paper tries to address is how to divide up scarce resources
when the involved parties have claims over it. A simple example is the question
of dividing up a bankrupt estate among the creditors. The existing literature has
tried to come up with ad hoc rules from the perspective of a neutral third party.
Proportional division is the most prominent of the several ad hoc rules. The ad
hoc rules differ from each other because of the axioms that are imposed in addi-
tion to efficiency and claims boundedness. Efficiency requires that the estate be
completely divided between the claimants, and claims boundedness requires that
no claimant be awarded more than her initial contribution. This paper tries to ex-
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plore if a rule will emerge in the long run if agents are asked to bargain amongst
themselves. It thus deals with bargaining problems with verifiable initial claims
of both parties. The surplus over which bargaining takes place is assumed to be
insufficient to honor all the claims completely.
It is shown that an ad hoc rule can be rationalized as the unique self-enforcing
long run outcome of Young’s [46] evolutionary bargaining model by adding cer-
tain intuitive rules to the usual Nash demand game. If the agents bargain in the
framework of the usual demand game, the long run stochastically stable equilib-
rium turns out to be equal division of the estate. If, in addition to the usual rules,
demanding more than one’s initial claim leads to a zero payoff (claims bounded-
ness) then the long run equilibrium corresponds to the constrained equal awards
rule. If the rules capture both claims boundedness and efficiency, then the long run
divisions are those prescribed by the truncated claims proportional rule.
Proportional division of a bankrupt estate among the creditors seems so just
and obvious that it is rarely debated. If we ask a person to act as an arbiter in such
a case, the answer will most likely be to divide the estate proportionally to initial
contributions. However, the inability of the framework to account for sunk claims
stops us short of obtaining exact proportionality.
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CHAPTER IV
INEQUALITY, INSECURE PROPERTY, AND CONFLICT
A. Introduction
Over the last two decades there has been an increasing interest in analyzing models
of conflict in economies in which property rights are not well defined or difficult
to enforce. The focus of this literature has been to characterize the equilibrium
level of investments made by the agents in the economy to secure a fraction of the
total output or the total inputs available in the economy using a non-cooperative
game theoretic framework. Such investments are socially unproductive and lead
to welfare losses which could be prevented if property rights were enforceable.
These studies are related to the rent seeking literature wherein agents compete
to win a prize (or a share of the prize) by making investments which are directly
unproductive but determine the probability with which an agent obtains the prize.
Skaperdas [41] provides the canonical static model of conflict in an economy
of two agents where the output depends on the simultaneous choice of productive
inputs by both the agents out of their exogenously given equal endowments. The
remaining endowment is invested in activities that are directly unproductive but
influence the share of output an agent obtains. Neary [34] generalizes this model
by incorporating inequalities in the initial endowments of the agents. Muthoo [31]
analyzes a repeated game wherein agents produce their own output and have to
decide whether to steal the other agent’s output, given exogenous probabilities of
successfully doing so. He concludes that if the agents are sufficiently patient then
there exists a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which no agent tries to steal
the other agents’ output and thereby shows that respect for property rights can
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emerge even in the absence of an external enforcement agency.
Our interest lies in analyzing conflict over inputs in the production process
and not the output. This is a crucial difference since a conflict over output, even
in a repeated setting, does not affect the initial conditions in subsequent periods,
but a conflict over inputs does. Grossman and Kim [21] consider a static model
of conflict over inputs between two agents endowed with unequal amounts of the
input that can be used to first produce defensive weapons, and then to produce
output or offensive weapons. Their aim is to highlight that there exist equilibria in
which both agents will invest in producing defensive weapons but not offensive
weapons. Hirshleifer [24] considers a semi-dynamic model in which the fraction
of the total input available in the economy an agent controls in the current period
depends on his investment in weapons during the previous period. The focus
of his paper is to analyze the conditions under which the economy converges to
equilibrium allocations.
In this paper, we try to provide a static model of conflict in which agents care
about current consumption and future shares of input. We believe this simple for-
mulation better captures the realities of a situation of conflict over inputs. Specifi-
cally, we consider an economy of two agents, initially holding unequal amounts of
the total available land. The agents produce output from the land they hold which
in turn can be allocated to consumption or the production of guns. The future
holdings of land are determined by the guns produced by both agents according
to an exogenously assumed functional form. (This is referred to as the contest suc-
cess function in the literature on conflict and rent seeking). Agents maximize the
weighted sum of utility from current consumption and the utility from future land
holding by simultaneously choosing how much to invest in guns. We character-
ize equilibria in which only one, both, and none of the agents produces guns, as a
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function of the total land and the inequality of initial land holdings.
Section 2 describes the set up of the model in detail and proves the existence
and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium for general forms of utility function, pro-
duction function, cost function for producing guns, and the contest success func-
tion. Given the total amount of land in the economy (L) and its initial distribution
(θ, (1 − θ)) between the two agents, four types of equilibria are possible- guns by
none, guns by only one, and guns by both. In Section 3 we analyze the mapping
between an (L, θ) pair and the type of equilibrium that arises when agents have
the same utility, production, and cost functions. It also provides some compara-
tive static results regarding the amount of guns being produced and the effect of
higher valuations of future land holdings relative to current consumption. Section
4 considers the effect of simple forms of heterogeneities in the production and cost
functions across the two agents. The discussion till Section 4 utilizes a contest suc-
cess function that assumes agents share the land equally if none of them produces
guns. Section 5 provides a condensed analysis of the problem using a contest suc-
cess function that assumes that land holdings of agents do not change if none of
them produces guns. Section 6 concludes and provides a brief discussion of the re-
lation between the model used in this paper, the models employed in the literature
on conflict, and the rent seeking literature.
B. The Model
L(> 0) is the total amount of land in the economy. θ ∈ (0, 0.5] is the fraction of the
total land initially held by the poor agent. Thus the poor agent controls θL units
and the rich agent controls (1 − θ)L units of land initially. Land is the only input
in production. Each agent decides how to allocate his output to consumption and
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production of guns. The cost of producing g units of guns is given by c(g). Guns
determine the future distribution of land between the two agents. The final fraction
of land held by the poor agent is given by the contest success function fp(gp, gr),
with fp(gp, gr)+fr(gp, gr) = 1. Each agent derives utility from current consumption
and the amount of land he will hold in the future. β(> 0) is the weight agents put
on utility from future land holdings. λy > 0 and λc > 0 reflect the difference in
the technology of producing output and guns between the two agents. The total
utility of poor agent is denoted by Vp and that of rich agent by Vr, where
Vp[gp, gr] = up[λyyp(θL)− λccp(gp)] + βLfp[gp, gr] (4.1)
Vr[gp, gr] = ur[yr((1− θ)L)− cr(gr)] + βLfr[gp, gr] (4.2)
The aim of the paper is to characterize the amount of guns being produced in
equilibrium as it reflects the welfare loss in the economy due to the absence of well
defined property rights. We are interested in obtaining results for general forms
of utility function, cost function, production function and the contest success func-
tion.
Assumption 1: u′ ≥ 0, u′(0) =∞, u′′ < 0, u′′′ > 0, y′ > 0, y′′ ≤ 0, c′ > 0, and c′′ ≥ 0.
The marginal utility of consumption is positive and decreasing for all levels of con-
sumption. The marginal utility of consumption is assumed to be infinite at c = 0
to ensure that both agents devote a strictly positive amount of their output to con-
sumption for all values of L and θ under consideration. The production function
is weakly concave, and the cost of producing guns is weakly convex.
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Assumption 2(a): 0 < fi < 1, ∂fi∂gi > 0,
∂2fi
∂g2i
< 0, ∂fi
∂gj
< 0, ∂
2fi
∂gj∂gi
≥ 0 if gi ≥ gj ,
f(g, g) = 0.5, ∂fi
∂gi
=
∂fj
∂gj
at(g, g), ∂
∂gi
[
∂fi
∂gi
∂fj
∂gj
] ≤ 0.
Guns affect the future distribution of land. The future land holding of both agents
is positive because we assume that infinite investment in guns is required by an
agent to capture all the land, for any given finite investment in guns by the other
agent. The marginal effect of guns is assumed to be positive but decreasing in one’s
own investment in guns for all levels of guns of the other agent. For any given
amount of one’s own guns, one’s future land holding decreases as guns of the
other agent increase. Agents share the land equally if they have the same amount
of guns. An example of a contest success function that satisfies these assumptions
is
fp(gp, gr;α) =
0.5α + h(gp)
α+ h(gp) + h(gr)
where α > 0 is a constant and h(·) is a increasing and concave function. The
higher is α, the lower will be the effectiveness of guns in determining the final
land holdings. Most of the contest success functions used in the conflict and rent
seeking literatures are special cases of this specification (Amegashie [2]).
It might be argued that if both agents do not produce any guns then the final
fractions held by the two agents should equal the initial fractions. This leads us to
consider an alternative specification of the contest success function whose proper-
ties are summarized below.
Assumption 2(b): 0 < f θi < 1,
∂fθi
∂gi
> 0, ∂
2fθi
∂g2i
< 0, ∂f
θ
i
∂gj
< 0, fp(0, 0) = θ,
∂fθp
∂θ
> 0,
∂
∂θ
[
∂fθp
∂gp
] < 0, ∂
∂θ
[∂f
θ
r
∂gr
] > 0, ∂
∂gi
[
∂fθi
∂gi
∂fθ
j
∂gj
] < 0, ∂
2fθp
∂gr∂gp
< 0 if gp < gr,
∂fθr
∂gr
→ 0, ifθ → 0.
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An example of a contest success function that satisfies Assumption 2(b) is
f θp (gp, gr; θ, α) =
θα + h(gp)
α+ h(gp) + h(gr)
This contest success function embodies history dependence in the final shares and
has not been studied in the literature on conflict to the best of our knowledge.
Corchon [11] uses a function based on the same idea of history dependence to
analyze rent seeking expenditures in a model where agents have unequal prior
probabilities of obtaining the prize.
1. Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium
The poor agent chooses gp ∈ [0, c−1p [ 1λy yp(θL)]] to maximize Vp taking gr as given.
Similarly, the rich agent chooses gr ∈ [0, c−1r [yr((1− θ)L)]] to maximize Vr taking gp
as given. The optimal values (g∗p, g∗r) constitute the Nash equilibrium. Note that
∂Vp
∂gp
= − λcu′p[λyyp(θL)− λccp(gp)].c′p(gp) + βL
∂fp
∂gp
∀ gp, gr (4.3)
The term λcu′p[yp(θL) − cp(gp)].c′p(gp) gives the marginal cost of allocating output
to guns. βL∂fp
∂gp
gives the corresponding marginal benefit. (For the sake of brevity
we will not write the arguments whenever unnecessary. We will however keep
the subscripts to distinguish the agents.) The marginal total utility from allocating
output to guns is decreasing with respect to one’s own investment in guns, as
∂2Vp
∂g2p
= − λc[u′p.c′′p − λcu′′p.(c′p)2] + βL
∂2fp
∂g2p
< 0 ∀ gp, gr (4.4)
Also,
∂2Vp
∂gr∂gp
= βL
∂2fp
∂gr∂gp
∀ gp, gr (4.5)
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Similarly,
∂Vr
∂gr
= − u′r.c′r + βL
∂fr
∂gr
∀ gp, gr (4.6)
∂2Vr
∂g2r
= − [u′r.c′′r − u′′r .(c′r)2] + βL
∂2fr
∂g2r
< 0 ∀ gp, gr (4.7)
∂2Vr
∂gp∂gr
= βL
∂2fr
∂gp∂gr
∀ gp, gr (4.8)
Since, fp + fr = 1
∂fp
∂gp
+
∂fr
∂gp
=
∂fp
∂gr
+
∂fr
∂gr
=
∂2fp
∂gr∂gp
+
∂2fr
∂gp∂gr
= 0 (4.9)
Proposition 1: There exists a unique Nash equilibrium (g∗p, g∗r) for any given (L, θ)
pair.
Proof: The strategy set of both agents is compact and convex. The payoff function
is continuous and concave in a player’s own strategy (∂
2Vi
∂g2i
< 0). Moreover, the
Jacobian of the implicit form of the best response functions given by
J(gp, gr) =
 −[u′p.c′′p − u′′p.(c′p)2] + βL∂2fp∂g2p βL ∂2fp∂gr∂gp
βL ∂
2fr
∂gp∂gr
− [u′r.c′′r − u′′r .(c′r)2] + βL∂
2fr
∂g2r

is clearly negative definite as both the diagonal elements are negative, and the de-
terminant of J(gp, gr) is positive. Hence, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium
for any given (L, θ) pair (Rosen, [38]). The proposition also holds for the contest
success functions of the type f θp (·). We can characterize the equilibria that emerge
for the various feasible (L, θ) pairs based upon whether only one, both, or none of
the agents invest in guns. The model can thus lead to the following four types of
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equilibria.
No guns (g∗p = 0, g∗r = 0): For a given (L, θ) pair, the no guns equilibrium will arise
if even after consuming all the output the marginal cost of guns is no less than the
marginal benefit of guns for both agents. Or,
∂Vp
∂gp
|(gp=0,gr=0) ≤ 0 and
∂Vr
∂gr
|(gp=0,gr=0) ≤ 0 (4.10)
Guns by rich only (g∗p = 0, g∗r > 0): For some (L, θ) pairs it is possible that the rich
agent finds it worthwhile to forego consumption and allocate some of his output
to guns, but the poor agent does not. The (L, θ) pairs that can sustain this type of
equilibrium can be fully described by
∂Vp
∂gp
|(gp=0,gr>0) ≤ 0 and
∂Vr
∂gr
|(gp=0,gr>0) = 0 (4.11)
Guns by poor only (g∗p > 0, g∗r = 0): This equilibrium will characterized by
∂Vp
∂gp
|(gp>0,gr=0) = 0 and
∂Vr
∂gr
|(gp>0,gr=0) ≤ 0 (4.12)
Guns by both (g∗p > 0, g∗r > 0): The equilibrium in which both agents produce
guns is given by
∂Vp
∂gp
|(gp>0,gr>0) = 0 and
∂Vr
∂gr
|(gp>0,gr>0) = 0 (4.13)
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C. Equilibria with Same Utility, Production, and Cost Functions
We first present the results for the baseline model in which both agents have the
same utility, production, and cost functions, i.e., λy = λc = 1.
Lemma 1: There does not exist an equilibrium in which only the poor agent pro-
duces guns.
Proof: The first order conditions that characterize the equilibrium in which only
the poor agent produces guns are given in equation (4.12). These conditions re-
duce to the following two equations.
u′r[yr((1− θ)Lpg)]c′r(0) ≥ βLpg
∂fr
∂gr
(4.14)
u′p[yp(θLpg)− cp(gp)]c′p(gp) = βLpg
∂fp
∂gp
(4.15)
Note that, g∗p > g∗r implies
∂fr
∂gr
> ∂fp
∂gp
. Similarly, [yr((1 − θ)Lpg)] > [yp((θLpg) −
cp(gp))] and c′p(gp) > c′r(0) imply u′r[yr((1 − θ)Lpg)]c′r(0) < u′p[yp(θLpg) −
cp(gp)]c
′
p(gp). Hence, the two first order conditions can not hold simultaneously.
This in turn proves that there can not exist an equilibrium in which only the poor
agent produces guns.
Let Lng(θ) be the maximum value of total land in the economy till which no
agent produces guns for a given θ. The collection of Lng(θ) values for all θ ∈ (0, 0.5]
constitutes the upper boundary of the no-guns region in the (L, θ) space. One im-
plication of Lemma (1) is that at a given value of θ the rich agent will produce
strictly positive amount of guns for all L > Lng(θ). The poor agent will also start
producing guns for this value of θ once the total land in the economy reaches a
critical value denoted by Lbg(θ) ≥ Lng(θ). The collection of Lbg(θ) values for all
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θ ∈ (0, 0.5] constitutes the lower boundary of the region in the (L, θ) space in which
both agents produce guns. We characterize these boundaries in the following two
lemmas.
Lemma 2: The upper boundary of the no-guns region in (L, θ) space is upward
sloping and convex.
Proof: The boundary of the no guns region in the (L, θ) space is defined implicitly
by
∂Vr
∂gr
= 0 ⇒ u′r[yr((1− θ)L)].c′r(0) = kβL (4.16)
where, k = ∂fp
∂gp
|(0,0) = ∂fr∂gr |(0,0) = constant. Total differentiation of equation (4.15)
with respect to L, and θ gives
[(1− θ)u′′r .y′r.c′r(0)− kβ] · dLng + [−Lngu′′r .y′r.c′r(0)] · dθ = 0 (4.17)
⇒ ∂Lng(θ)
∂θ
=
Lngu
′′
r .y
′
r.c
′
r(0)
[(1− θ)u′′r .y′r.c′r(0)− kβ]
> 0 ∀ θ ∈ (0, 0.5] (4.18)
Thus, the boundary of the no-guns region is upward sloping. This boundary is
convex, as
∂2Lng(θ)
∂θ2
=
kβL2ng(u
′′′
r .(y
′
r)
2 + u′′r .y
′′
r ) + Lng(u
′′
r .y
′
r.cr(0))
2
[(1− θ)u′′r .y′r.c′r(0)− kβ]2
> 0 (4.19)
Lemma 3: The lower boundary of the region in which both agents produce guns
is downward sloping. The amount of guns along this boundary decreases as in-
equality decreases.
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Proof: For each θ ∈ (0, 0.5], the maximum amount of land that can sustain a Nash
equilibrium in which only the rich agent produces guns is implicitly defined by
∂Vr
∂gr
|gp=0,gr>0 = 0 and
∂Vp
∂gp
|(gp=0,gr>0) = 0 (4.20)
It has been proved in Lemma (1) that for any given θ ∈ (0, 0.5] if L ≤ Lng(θ), then
no agent produces guns. If L > Lng, the rich agent allocates a strictly positive
amount to guns but the poor agent may still not find it worthwhile to invest in
guns as it is possible that ∂Vp
∂gp
|(gp=0,gr>0) < 0. As we keep increasing L, we reach a
critical value of L equal to Lbg(θ) such that in equilibrium
∂Vp
∂gp
|(gp=0,gr>0) becomes
zero and ∂Vr
∂gr
|(gp=0,gr>0) is also zero. At this point the poor agent will also start in-
vesting in guns. The pairs [Lbg(θ), θ] define the boundary of the region in (L, θ)
space above which the equilibrium involves both agents investing in guns.
The [Lng(θ), θ] boundary was completely determined by only one equation (4.15).
g∗p and g∗r were both zero along the upper boundary of the no-guns region. The first
order condition of the rich agent (∂Vr
∂gr
|(gp=0,gr=0) = 0)was sufficient to determineLng
as a function of θ, because
∂Vr
∂gr
|(gp=0,gr=0) = 0 ⇒
∂Vp
∂gp
|(gp=0,gr=0) < 0
It is important to note that [Lbg(θ), θ] boundary above which the poor agent
also invests in guns can not be analogously characterized by using only the first
order condition of the poor agent (∂Vp
∂gp
|(gp=0,gr>0) = 0). This is because the equi-
librium investment in guns by the rich agent (g∗r) can vary along this boundary,
unlike the [Lng(θ), θ] boundary along which g∗r is always zero. Hence, we need the
first order condition of both agents. Equation (19) defines this boundary. It should
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be interpreted as a system of two equations in three unknowns (L, θ, gr). The two
equalities in equation (4.19) can be rewritten as
u′r[yr((1− θ)Lpg)− cr(gr)]c′r(gr)− βLpg
∂fr
∂gr
= 0 (4.21)
and
u′p[yp(θLpg)]c
′
p(0)− βLpg
∂fp
∂gp
= 0 (4.22)
The collection of (L, θ, gr) values that satisfy the above two equations define the
boundary in (L, θ) space above which the poor agent also invests in guns. Suppose,
(L1, θ1, g1r) is one such point. If we change θ slightly, both L and gr will (potentially)
vary to ensure that the two equalities still hold. This operation can be summarized
by the total differentiation of each equation with respect to L, θ, and gr as given
below.
[(1−θ)u′′r .c′r.y′r−β
∂fr
∂gr
] ·dLpg+[u′r.c′′r −u′′r .(c′r)2−βLpg
∂2fr
∂g2r
] ·dgr = [Lpgu′′r .c′r.y′r] ·dθ
(4.23)
[θu′′p.y
′
p.c
′
p − β
∂fp
∂gp
] · dLpg + [−βLpg ∂
2fp
∂gr∂gp
] · dgr = [−Lpgu′′p.y′p.c′p] · dθ (4.24)
Define
∆1 =
 (1− θ)u′′r .c′r.y′r − β ∂fr∂gr u′r.c′′r − u′′r .(c′r)2 − βLpg ∂2fr∂g2r
θu′′p.y
′
p.c
′
p − β ∂fp∂gp − βLpg
∂2fp
∂gr∂gp

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∆θ1(Lpg) =
 Lpgu′′r .c′r.y′r u′r.c′′r − u′′r .(c′r)2 − βLpg ∂2fr∂g2r
−Lpgu′′p.y′p.c′p − βLpg ∂
2fp
∂gr∂gp

∆θ1(gr) =
 (1− θ)u′′r .c′r.y′r − β ∂fr∂gr Lpgu′′r .c′r.y′r
θu′′p.y
′
p.c
′
p − β ∂fp∂gp − Lpgu′′p.y′p.c′p

The determinant of ∆θ1(Lpg), and ∆θ1(gr) is unambiguously negative. The determi-
nant of ∆1 is positive under a weak assumption. Using Cramer’s rule we obtain
∂Lpg
∂θ
=
|∆θ1(Lpg)|
|∆1| < 0 &
∂gr
∂θ
=
| ∆θ1(gr) |
| ∆1 | < 0 along the (Lpg, θ) boundary.
(4.25)
1. Guns and Welfare
We now give comparative static results on the amount of guns that are produced
as the total land or the inequality in initial land holdings changes.
Lemma 4: For L ∈ (Lng, Lbg), the rich agent produces more guns with an increase
in L holding θ constant, but less guns with an increase in θ holding constant.
Proof: Consider an economy characterized by an (L, θ) pair such that Lng < L <
Lbg. In this economy only the rich agent would be producing guns. Moreover, for
small changes in L, or θ the poor agent will still not produce guns. The effect of an
increase in land while holding inequality constant (or, vice versa) can be obtained
by the appropriate total differentiation of the first order condition of the rich agent.
The first order condition of the rich agent for all θ and L ∈ (Lng, Lbg) is
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u′r[yr((1− θ)L)− cr(gr)]c′r(gr)− βL
∂fr
∂gr
= 0 (4.26)
Total differentiation of this equation with respect to L and gr, and θ and gr gives
∂gr
∂L
=
[β ∂fr
∂gr
− (1− θ)u′′r .c′r.y′r]
[u′r.c′′r − u′′r .(c′r)2 − βL∂
2fr
∂g2r
]
> 0 (4.27)
And,
∂gr
∂θ
=
[Lu′′r .c
′
r.y
′
r]
[u′r.c′′r − u′′r .(c′r)2 − βL∂
2fr
∂g2r
]
< 0 (4.28)
Lemma 5: For L > Lbg, an increase in land for a given level of inequality leads to
higher production of guns by the rich agent. The effect on the poor agents’ pro-
duction of guns is not necessarily monotonic.
Proof: The first order conditions that characterize an equilibrium involving pro-
duction of guns by both agents are given by equation (13), and can be rewritten
as
u′r[yr((1−θ)L)−cr(gr)]c′r(gr)−βL
∂fr
∂gr
= 0 & u′p[yp(θL)−cp(gp)]c′p(gp)−βL
∂fp
∂gp
= 0
(4.29)
Total differentiation of this system with respect to gr, gp, and L gives
[u′r.c
′′
r −u′′r .(c′r)2−βL
∂2fr
∂g2r
] ·dgr+[−βL ∂
2fr
∂gp∂gr
] ·dgp = [−(1−θ)u′′r .c′r.y′r+β
∂fr
∂gr
] ·dL
(4.30)
[−βL ∂
2fp
∂gr∂gp
]·dgr+[u′p.c′′p−u′′p.(c′p)2−βL
∂2fr
∂g2r
]·dgp = [−θu′′p.y′p.c′p+β
∂fp
∂gp
]·dL (4.31)
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We can now define
∆2 =
 u′r.c′′r − u′′r .(c′r)2 − βL∂2fr∂g2r − βL ∂2fr∂gp∂gr
−βL ∂2fp
∂gr∂gp
u′p.c
′′
p − u′′p.(c′p)2 − βL∂
2fr
∂g2r

∆L2 (gr) =
 −(1− θ)u′′r .c′r.y′r + β ∂fr∂gr − βL ∂2fr∂gp∂gr
−θu′′p.y′p.c′p + β ∂fp∂gp u′p.c′′p − u′′p.(c′p)2 − βL
∂2fr
∂g2r

∆L2 (gp) =
 u′r.c′′r − u′′r .(c′r)2 − βL∂2fr∂g2r − (1− θ)u′′r .c′r.y′r + β ∂fr∂gr
−βL ∂2fp
∂gr∂gp
− θu′′p.y′p.c′p + β ∂fp∂gp

The determinant of ∆2, and ∆L2 (gr) is always positive, but that of ∆L2 (gp) is difficult
to establish. We have
∂gr
∂L
=
|∆L2 (gr)|
|∆2| > 0 and
∂gp
∂L
=
|∆L2 (gp)|
|∆2| > or < 0 (4.32)
Lemma 6: For all L > Lbg, an increase in θ (equality) for a given L leads to higher
production of guns by the poor agent.
Proof: The first order conditions that characterize an equilibrium involving pro-
duction of guns by both agents are given by equation (26). Total differentiation of
this system with respect to gr, gp, and θ gives
[u′r.c
′′
r − u′′r .(c′r)2 − βL
∂2fr
∂g2r
] · dgr + [−βL ∂
2fr
∂gp∂gr
] · dgp = [Lu′′r .y′r.c′r] · dθ (4.33)
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[−βL ∂
2fp
∂gr∂gp
] · dgr + [u′p.c′′p − u′′p.(c′p)2 − βL
∂2fr
∂g2r
] · dgp = [−Lu′′p.y′p.c′p] · dθ (4.34)
Let us define
∆θ2(gr) =
 Lu′′r .y′r.c′r − βL ∂2fr∂gp∂gr
−Lu′′p.y′p.c′p u′p.c′′p − u′′p.(c′p)2 − βL∂
2fr
∂g2r

∆θ2(gp) =
 u′r.c′′r − u′′r .(c′r)2 − βL∂2fr∂g2r Lu′′r .y′r.c′r
−βL ∂2fp
∂gr∂gp
− Lu′′p.y′p.c′p

The determinant of ∆θ2(gp) is positive but that of ∆θ2(gr) does not have an unam-
biguous sign. Thus
∂gr
∂θ
=
8
g
|∆θ2(gr)||∆2| > or < 0 and
∂gp
∂θ
=
|∆θ2(gp)|
|∆2| > 0 (4.35)
It would be interesting to know the degree of welfare loss in the economy as
measured by the fraction of total output spent on the production of guns. Unfortu-
nately, the results in this section show that it is difficult to determine whether the
production of guns is increasing or decreasing with changes in total and inequality
for all the possible values. This is the drawback of using general forms of utility,
production, cost, and contest success functions.
2. Effect of β
Lemma 7: Higher weight on future land holdings lowers the upper boundary of
the no-guns region.
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Proof: This follows from implicitly differentiating equation () with respect to β
and L, holding θ constant.
∂Lng(θ)
∂β
=
kLng
[(1− θ)u′′r .y′r.c′r(0)− kβ]
< 0 ∀ θ ∈ (0, 0.5] (4.36)
Lemma 8: At a given (L, θ) such that Lng < L < Lbg, the amount of guns produced
by the rich agent will increase if β increases.
Proof: This follows immediately from the total differentiation of the first order
condition of the rich agent (equation 21) with respect to gr and β, while holding L
and θ constant.
∂gr
∂β
=
[L∂fr
∂gr
]
[u′r.c′′r − u′′r .(c′r)2 − βLpg ∂
2fr
∂g2r
]
> 0 (4.37)
Lemma 9: An increase in β lowers the lower boundary of the region in which both
agents produce guns.
Proof: We need to show that if β increases then the value of L that satisfies equal-
ities in equations (20)and(21) decreases, for any given θ. Total differential of this
system with respect to L, gr, and β gives
[(1−θ)u′′r .c′r.y′r−β
∂fr
∂gr
]·dLpg+[u′r.c′′r−u′′r .(c′r)2−βLpg
∂2fr
∂g2r
]·dgr = [Lpg ∂fr
∂gr
]·dβ (4.38)
[θu′′p.y
′
p.c
′
p − β
∂fp
∂gp
] · dLpg + [−βLpg ∂
2fp
∂gr∂gp
] · dgr = [Lpg ∂fp
∂gp
] · dβ (4.39)
Define,
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∆β1 (Lpg) =
 Lpg ∂fr∂gr u′r.c′′r − u′′r .(c′r)2 − βLpg ∂2fr∂g2r
Lpg
∂fp
∂gp
− βLpg ∂
2fp
∂gr∂gp

The determinant of ∆β1 (Lpg) is always negative, and thus
∂Lpg
∂β
=
|∆β1 (Lpg)|
|∆1| < 0 (4.40)
Lemma 10: For L > Lbg, an increase in β holding L and θ constant leads to higher
production of guns by both agents.
Proof: The first order conditions that characterize an equilibrium in which both
agents produce guns are given in equation (26). Total differentiation of this system
with respect to gr, gp, and β gives
[u′r.c
′′
r − u′′r .(c′r)2 − βL
∂2fr
∂g2r
] · dgr + [−βL ∂
2fr
∂gp∂gr
] · dgp = [L∂fr
∂gr
] · dβ (4.41)
[−βL ∂
2fp
∂gr∂gp
] · dgr + [u′p.c′′p − u′′p.(c′p)2 − βL
∂2fr
∂g2r
] · dgp = [L∂fp
∂gp
] · dβ (4.42)
Define
∆β2 (gr) =
 L∂fr∂gr − βL ∂2fr∂gp∂gr
L∂fp
∂gp
u′p.c
′′
p − u′′p.(c′p)2 − βL∂
2fr
∂g2r

∆β2 (gp) =
 u′r.c′′r − u′′r .(c′r)2 − βL∂2fr∂g2r L∂fr∂gr
−βL ∂2fp
∂gr∂gp
L∂fp
∂gp

The determinant of ∆β2 (gr), and ∆
β
2 (gp) is positive. Thus,
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∂gr
∂β
=
|∆β2 (gr)|
|∆2| > 0 and
∂gp
∂β
=
|∆β2 (gp)|
|∆2| > 0 (4.43)
D. Effect of Heterogeneity
We now try to analyze the effect of simple forms of heterogeneity in production
function and cost function across the agents. In order to simplify the analysis we
will consider heterogeneity in only one of the functions at a time. The major aim is
once again to come up with the characterization of the equilibrium.
1. Heterogeneous Production Functions
Let the production function of the poorly endowed agent be λyyp(·), and that of
the rich agent be yr(·), with yp(·) = yr(·) as before. We interpret λy as a parameter
that reflects the technological difference between the two agents. By Proposition 1,
there exists a unique Nash equilibrium for a given (L, θ) pair, and any given λy > 0.
We make the additional assumption that yp(·)(= yr(·)) is a linear function of its ar-
gument. However, all the results in this section hold for any concave production
function. It is easy to show that for a given λ > 1, there exists θy = 11+λy ∈ (0, 0.5),
such that for all θ > θy the poorly endowed agent has a greater output than the
richly endowed agent. When λy ≤ 1, the poorly endowed agent never produces
more output for all θ ∈ (0, 0.5), and all L > 0. The immediate implication is that
for θ > θy as L increases the poorly endowed agent will start producing guns first.
The boundary of the no guns region now consists of two distinct curves as sum-
marized in the following lemma.
Lemma 11: For λy > 1, the upper boundary of the no guns region is upward
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sloping and convex for 0 < θ < θy, and downward sloping and convex for θy <
θ < 0.5.
Proof: From the discussion above, the upper boundary of the no-guns region is
defined by
u′r[((1− θ)Lrng)].c′r(0) = kβLrng if θ ≤ θy (4.44)
and
u′p[λy(θL
p
ng)].c
′
p(0) = kβL
p
ng if θ ≥ θy (4.45)
This boundary is convex and increasing in θ for θ < θy (see Lemma (2)). Although
convex, it is decreasing in θ for θ > θy since
∂Lpng(θ)
∂θ
=
−λyLpngu′′p.c′p(0)
[λy(θL
p
ng)u′′p.c′p(0)− kβ]
< 0 ∀ θ ∈ (0, 0.5] (4.46)
and
∂2Lpng(θ)
∂θ2
=
λ2yL
p
ng[kβL
p
ng(u
′′′
p .c
′
p(0)) + (u
′′
pc
′
p(0))
2]
[λy(θL
p
ng)u′′p.c′p(0)− kβ]2
> 0 ∀ θ ∈ (0, 0.5] (4.47)
From the analysis of the previous section we can conclude that for any θ < θy there
exists an Lpbg > L
r
ng such that the poor agent also produces guns for all L > L
p
bg.
Similarly, for any θ > θy there exists an Lrbg > L
p
ng such that the rich agent also pro-
duces guns for all L > Lr. The combination of L
p
bg(θ|θ < θy) and Lrbg(θ|θ > θy) de-
fines the boundary above which both agents produce guns. The following lemma
characterizes this boundary.
Lemma 12: The boundary above which both agents produce guns is downward
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sloping for θ < θy, and upward sloping for θ > θy, for any given λy > 1.
Proof: For a given θ ∈ (0, 0.5) and λy > 1, the minimum amount of land above
which both agents produce guns is implicitly defined by
∂Vr
∂gr
|(gp=0,gr>0) = 0 &
∂Vp
∂gp
|(gp=0,gr>0) = 0 for θ < θy (4.48)
and
∂Vr
∂gr
|gp>0,gr=0 = 0 &
∂Vp
∂gp
|(gp>0,gr=0) = 0 for θ > θy (4.49)
The first set of conditions determine the boundary for the case where the poor
agent is the last to produce guns. The first set of conditions defined for θ < θy
are exactly similar to the set of equalities in equation (20). Hence, the required
boundary will be downward sloping for θ < θy, and the amount of guns being
produced by the rich agent will be decreasing along the boundary (see Lemma (3)).
The second set of equalities defined for θ > θy can be rewritten as
u′r[(1−θ)Lrbg]c′r(0)−βLrbg
∂fr
∂gr
= 0 & u′p[λyθL
r
bg−cp(gp)]c′p(gp)−βLrbg
∂fp
∂gp
= 0 (4.50)
Total differential of this system with respect to Lrbg, gp, and θ gives
[(1− θ)u′′r .c′r(0)− β
∂fr
∂gr
] · dLrbg + [−βLrbg
∂2fr
∂gp∂gr
] · dgp = [Lrbgu′′r .c′r(0)] · dθ (4.51)
[λyθu
′′
p.c
′
p−β
∂fp
∂gp
]·dLrbg+[u′p.c′′p−u′′p.(c′p)2−βLrbg
∂2fp
∂g2p
]·dgr = [−λyLrbgu′′p.c′p]·dθ (4.52)
Using Cramer’s rule to solve the above two equations gives
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∂Lrbg
∂θ
> 0 &
∂gp
∂θ
> 0 along the (Lrbg(θ > θy), θ) boundary. (4.53)
2. Heterogeneous Cost Functions
Let the cost function of the poorly endowed agent be λccp(·), and that of the rich
agent be cr(·), with cp(·) = cr(·) as before. We interpret λc as a parameter that re-
flects the difference in the technology of producing guns. By Proposition 1, there
exists a unique Nash equilibrium for a given (L, θ) pair, and any given λc > 0. If
λc > 1, then the poorly endowed agent has a cost disadvantage as well and the
nature of results obtained in Section (3) does not change. However,
Lemma 13: For a given λc < 1, there exists a θc ∈ (0, 0.5) such that for all θ > θc the
poor agent starts producing guns before the rich agent as L increases.
Proof: Suppose the rich agent starts producing guns before the poor agent for all
θ ∈ (0, 0.5). The value Lrng(θ) at which this happens for a given θ will then be
implicitly given by
u′r[yr((1− θ)Lrng]c′r(0)− kβLrng = 0 (4.54)
If the poor agent were to start producing guns before the rich agent for all θ ∈
(0, 0.5) then the Lpng at which this for a given θ will be implicitly given by
λcu
′
p[yp(θL
p
ng)]c
′
p(0)− kβLpng = 0 (4.55)
It can be verified that ∂L
r
ng
∂θ
> 0, whereas ∂L
p
ng
∂θ
< 0. Moreover, Lrng(θ → 0) < Lpng(θ →
0), but Lpng(θ = 0.5) < Lrng(θ = 0.5). Hence, we conclude that for any λc < 1 there
exists a θc ∈ (0, 0.5) such that Lpng(θc) = Lrng(θc), Lrng(θ|θ < θc) < Lpng(θ|θ < θc), and
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Lpng(θ|θ > θc) < Lrng(θ|θ > θc).
Lemma 14: The lower boundary of the region in which both agents produce guns
is downward sloping for θ < θc, and upward sloping for θ > θc, for any given
λc < 1. (The proof is similar to that of Lemma (12)).
E. History Dependence
The analysis till now has assumed that if none of the agents produces guns then
they share the land equally in future irrespective of the heterogeneity in initial
land holdings. In this section we characterize the equilibria for various (L, θ) pairs
under the assumption that the final land holdings are the same as the initial land
holdings if no agent produces guns. Specifically, we make the following assump-
tions.
Assumption 2(b): 0 < f θi < 1,
∂fθi
∂gi
> 0, ∂
2fθi
∂g2i
< 0, ∂f
θ
i
∂gj
< 0, f θp (0, 0) = θ,
∂fθp
∂θ
> 0,
∂
∂θ
[
∂fθp
∂gp
] < 0, ∂
∂θ
[∂f
θ
r
∂gr
] > 0, ∂
∂gi
[
∂fθi
∂gi
∂fθ
j
∂gj
] < 0, ∂
2fθp
∂gr∂gp
< 0 if gp < gr,
∂fθr
∂gr
→ 0, if θ → 0.
We again assume that up(·) = ur(·), yp(·) = yr(·), and cp(·) = cr(·). λy represents
the difference in production technology, and λc the difference in the technology of
producing guns.
1. Heterogeneous Production Functions
Let the production function of the richly endowed agent be yr(·), and that of the
poorly endowed agent be λyyp(·). Proposition 1 still holds and thus there exists a
unique Nash equilibrium for any feasible (L, θ) pair. It is difficult to separate the
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(L, θ) space into regions that support one of the four possible types of equilibria.
We will focus our attention on determining the effect of λy.
Conjecture 1: For θ sufficiently close to zero, the poorly endowed agent starts
producing guns at a lower value of L than the richly endowed agent, for all λy > 0.
Proof: Suppose the richly endowed agent starts producing guns first, for all θ ∈
(0, 0.5]. If so, the upper boundary of the no-guns region will be given by
∂Vr
∂gr
|(gp=0,gr>0) = 0 (4.56)
⇒ u′r[yr((1− θ)Lrng]c′r(0)− βLrng
∂f θr
∂gr
= 0 (4.57)
Since, ∂f
θ
r
∂gr
→ 0 as θ → 0 (by Assumption 2(b)), Lrng → ∞ as θ → 0.
Next, suppose the poorly endowed agent starts producing guns first, for all θ ∈
(0, 0.5]. The upper boundary of the no-guns region will then be given by
∂Vp
∂gp
|(gp>0,gr=0) = 0 (4.58)
⇒ u′p[λyyp(θLpng)]c′r(0)− βLpng
∂f θp
∂gp
= 0 (4.59)
Since, ∂f
θ
p
∂gp
→ 1 as θ → 0 (by Assumption 2(b)), Lpng will be a finite number as
θ → 0. This proves the conjecture.
Conjecture 2: Higher values of λy > 0 make it more likely that the poorly endowed
agent starts producing guns at a lower value of L than the richly endowed agent,
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for all θ ∈ (0, 0.5].
Proof: The lower Lpng for a given θ, the more likely it will be that the poorly en-
dowed agent is the first to produce guns. We begin by showing that an increase in
λy lowers the (Lpng, θ) boundary. Equation (46) gives
∂Lpng
∂λy
=
−u′′p.yp.c′p(0)
[λyθu′′p.y′p.c′p(0)− β ∂f
θ
p
∂gp
]
< 0 (4.60)
For λy = 1, Lpng(θ = 0.5) = Lpng(θ = 0.5). The (Lrng, θ) boundary does not get af-
fected by changes in λy. Thus, if λy > 1 then the poorly endowed agent will be the
first to produce guns for θ sufficiently close to 0.5.
We have characterized the (Lrng, θ), and the (Lpng, θ) boundaries in the previous con-
jecture. Now we will show that both these boundaries are downward sloping
when θ is close to zero, and convex for all θ ∈ (0, 0.5] and all λy > 0. Equation
(54) gives
∂Lrng
∂θ
=
Lrngu
′′
r .y
′
r.c
′
r(0) + βL
r
ng
∂
∂θ
[∂f
θ
r
∂gr
]
[(1− θ)u′′r .y′r.c′r(0)− β ∂f
θ
r
∂gr
]
(4.61)
The sign of ∂L
r
ng
∂θ
can not be determined without assuming particular functional
forms. However, the slope is negative when θ is close to zero. Moreover, the
(Lrng, θ) boundary is convex since
∂2Lrng
∂θ2
can be shown to be strictly positive.
Similarly, equation (55) gives
∂Lpng
∂θ
=
−λyLpngu′′p.y′p.c′p(0) + βLpng ∂∂θ [
∂fθp
∂gp
]
[λyθu′′p.y′p.c′p(0)− β ∂f
θ
p
∂gp
]
(4.62)
The sign of ∂L
p
ng
∂θ
is difficult to determine. The (Lpng, θ) boundary is also convex as
∂2Lrng
∂θ2
given by
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λyβ(L
p
ng)
2c′p(0)[λyu
′′′
p .(y
′
p)
2 + u′′p.y
′′
p ][
∂fθp
∂gp
− θ ∂
∂θ
[
∂fθp
∂gp
]] + L[λyu
′′
p.y
′
p.c
′
p(0)− β ∂∂θ [
∂fθp
∂gp
]]2
[λyθu′′p.y′p.c′p(0)− β ∂f
θ
p
∂gp
]2
(4.63)
is strictly positive.
2. Heterogeneous Cost Functions
Let the cost function for producing guns be cr(·) and λccp(·) for the richly and the
poorly endowed agent, respectively. As before, cr(·) = cp(·), and λc > 0. We will
argue that a lower λc makes it more likely that the poorly endowed agent will
produce guns first. The (Lrng, θ) boundary and its properties will be the same as in
the previous case since while allowing for heterogeneity we are only altering the
poorly endowed agent’s specification. Now, suppose the poorly endowed agent
starts producing guns first, for all θ ∈ (0, 0.5]. The upper boundary of the no-guns
region will then be given by
∂Vp
∂gp
|gp>0,gr=0 = 0
⇒ λcu′p[yp(θLpng)]c′r(0)− βLpng
∂f θp
∂gp
= 0 (4.64)
Since, ∂f
θ
p
∂gp
→ 1 as θ → 0 (by Assumption 2(b)), Lpng will be a finite number as
θ → 0. This helps us conclude that when θ is close to zero the poorly endowed
agent will start producing guns at a lower value of L as compared to the richly en-
dowed agent. The following derivative summarizes the effect of λc on the (Lpng, θ)
boundary.
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∂Lpng
∂λc
=
−u′p.c′p(0)
[λcθu′′p.y′p.c′p(0)− β ∂f
θ
p
∂gp
]
> 0 (4.65)
It is easy to verify that Lpng(θ = 0.5) = Lrng(θ = 0.5) if λc = 1. The above derivative
thus implies that for λc < 1 the poorly endowed agent will be the first to produce
guns for values of θ close to 0.5.
3. An Example
It is difficult to characterize the equilibria for various values of θ away from 0 and
0.5 under the assumption that the final land holdings are the same as the initial
land holdings if no agent produces guns, for all concave utility functions, concave
production functions, and convex cost functions. We now try to do so for a partic-
ular case by assuming u(x) = xγ , y(x) = x, where 0 < α < 1. The results in this
section hold for all concave production functions of the form y(x) = xδ.
a. Heterogeneous Production Functions
Proposition 1: (i) The poorly endowed agent starts producing guns at a lower
value of L than the richly endowed agent for all θ ∈ (0, 0.5) if λy ≥ 1. (ii) For
every given λy < 1, there exists a θy ∈ (0, 0.5) such that the rich agent is the first to
produce guns for all θ ∈ (0, θy); the rich agent produces guns first for θ ∈ (θy, 0.5].
Proof: Suppose the richly endowed agent starts producing guns first, for all θ ∈
(0, 0.5].
−α[(1− θ)Lrng]α−1c′r(0) + βLrngθ = 0 ⇒ Lrng(θ) = [
α(1− θ)α−1c′r(0)
βθ
]
1
2−α (4.66)
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Next, suppose the poorly endowed agent starts producing guns first, for all θ ∈
(0, 0.5]. The upper boundary of the no-guns region will then be given by
−α[λyθLpng]α−1c′p(0)+ βLpng(1− θ) = 0 ⇒ Lpng(θ) = [
α(λyθ)
α−1c′p(0)
β(1− θ) ]
1
2−α (4.67)
Note that, Lpng(θ) ≤ Lrng(θ) for all θ ∈ (0, 0.5] if
λα−1y θ ≤ (1− θ) ⇒ λy ≥ 1 (4.68)
Let us now consider the case of λy < 1. For any given λy < 1, Lpng(θ) ≤ Lrng(θ) if
λα−1y θ ≤ (1− θ) ⇒ θ ≤
1
1 + λα−1y
= θy (4.69)
Moreover, since λy < 1, θy ∈ (0, 0.5). We can characterize the lower boundary of the
region in (L, θ) space in which both agents produce guns in the manner described
in Lemma (12).
b. Heterogeneous Cost Functions
Proposition 2: (i) The poorly endowed agent starts producing guns at a lower
value of L than the richly endowed agent for all θ ∈ (0, 0.5) if λc ≤ 1. (ii) For
every given λc > 1, there exists a θc ∈ (0, 0.5) such that the rich agent is the first to
produce guns for all θ ∈ (0, θc); the rich agent produces guns first for θ ∈ (θc, 0.5].
Proof: Suppose the richly endowed agent starts producing guns first, for all θ ∈
(0, 0.5]. The boundary of the no guns region will be given by
−α[(1− θ)Lrng]α−1c′r(0) + βLrngθ = 0 ⇒ Lrng(θ) = [
α(1− θ)α−1c′r(0)
βθc′r(0)
]
1
2−α (4.70)
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Next, suppose the poorly endowed agent starts producing guns first, for all θ ∈
(0, 0.5]. The upper boundary of the no-guns region will then be given by
−λcα[θLpng]α−1c′p(0) + βLpng(1− θ) = 0 ⇒ Lpng(θ) = [
λcαθ
α−1c′p(0)
β(1− θ) ]
1
2−α (4.71)
Note that, Lpng(θ) ≤ Lrng(θ) for all θ ∈ (0, 0.5] if
λ
1
α
c θ ≤ (1− θ) ⇒ λc ≤ 1 (4.72)
Let us now consider the case of λc > 1. For any given λc > 1, Lpng(θ) ≤ Lrng(θ) if
λ
1
α
c θ ≤ (1− θ) ⇒ θ ≤ 1
1 + λ
1
α
c
= θc (4.73)
Since λc > 1, θc ∈ (0, 0.5). Once again, we can characterize the lower boundary
of the region in (L, θ) space in which both agents produce guns in the manner
described in Lemma (12).
F. Conclusion
The literature on conflict can be classified along several dimensions- whether the
conflict is over output or inputs, whether the output is produced jointly or sepa-
rately by the agents, whether the framework is static, repeated or dynamic, whether
the model is one of complete or incomplete information, whether the agents make
simultaneous or sequential choices, and so on. In this paper we have analyzed
a static model of conflict over an inexhaustible input between two agents where
agents make simultaneous choices. Our model distinguishes itself from those an-
alyzed in the literature till date on account of its generality and the analysis of
history dependent contest success function.
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The rent seeking literature can be thought of as the precursor to the literature
on conflict. The standard rent seeking model involves several agents expending
resources to win a pie of fixed size. The objective of this literature has been to
characterize the existence of equilibrium levels of expenditures by the agents. The
expected utility of an agent in a general model of rent seeking is given by
EUi(gi, G−i) = pi(gi, G−i).ui(ei + L− gi) + (1− pi(gi, G−i)).ui(ei − gi)
where ei is the endowment of agent i, L is the pie agents are competing over, gi
is the expenditure by agent i to increase his chances of obtaining the pie, and pi is
the probability with which agent i obtains the pie, i.e., the contest success function.
The various studies can be characterized depending upon whether agents are risk
neutral or not, whether the agents are homogeneous or heterogeneous, whether
the endowment constraint is binding or not, whether the number of agents in the
rent seeking context is fixed or there is free entry, whether agents make sequential
or simultaneous expenditures, what is the form of the contest success function, and
so on. The interested reader can refer to Nitzan [35], Tollison [44], and Cornes and
Hartley [12], [13] for details. For a comparison of rent seeking and conflict models
please refer to Hausken [22]. The rent seeking models with homogeneous risk
neutral agents are special cases of the model given in the present paper because
the two will be strategically similar as
EUi(gi, G−i) = (ei − gi) + pi(gi, G−i).L
This formulation is similar to the one studied in the present paper with the
additional assumption that utility from current consumption is linear. However,
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the analysis of such a model will be slightly different from the one presented in this
paper as there will exist additional equilibria involving no consumption by either
one or both the agents. The unwelcome tradeoff we have to face while charac-
terizing the equilibria using general forms of utility production, cost, and contest
success functions is that we are unable to provide clear cut welfare calculations
which is central to the rent seeking literature.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
Game theoretic analysis of strategic interactions has become an integral part of the
economics literature. The essays in this dissertation illustrate the versatility of eco-
nomic reasoning. The second chapter provides a reason for the strict codes of con-
duct that have been imposed on unmarried girls in almost every society at some
point of time in its history using tools from classical game theory. The third chap-
ter rationalizes some of the adhoc rules proposed for dividing a bankrupt estate
from an evolutionary perspective. The fourth chapter presents a simple model of
conflict over inputs in an economy with ill-defined property rights. These studies
leave some related issues unanswered, and also give rise to several methodological
questions.
The signaling game presented in Chapter II assumes that all the men attach the
same prior probability to a girl being submissive. The common prior assumption
is frequently used in signaling games but there does not exist a strong conceptual
foundation for it. Another damaging criticism is the use of refinements to elimi-
nate some of the Nash equilibria. Cognitive limitations of individuals do not justify
the use of high rationality solution concepts in one shot games and there is over-
whelming laboratory evidence to support this. However, it can be expected that if
individuals face similar situations over time then they might be able to approach
an equilibrium through a process of trial and error. The third chapter on evolution
of division rules takes this approach. The assumption that agents repeatedly face
exactly the same situation is undeniably an oversimplification. We need models
of learning across situations that are similar but not exactly the same. The liter-
ature on stochastic stability is built around the assumption that it is the errors or
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experiments by agents that help select the long run equilibria from the set of possi-
ble stage game equilibria. The fact that different specifications of the error process
often lead to the selection of different equilibria as the long run outcomes casts
doubt on the generality of the results. It would be desirable to supplement the the-
oretical results of this chapter with experimental evidence regarding what division
people consider as fair in a situation like bankruptcy. The model of conflict pre-
sented in chapter IV questions the accepted wisdom underlying folk-theorem type
of arguments by showing that an increase in valuation of future leads to increased
conflict. The reason is that most the models used to elucidate the folk theorem em-
ploy repetitions of the same stage game where the initial conditions in successive
periods are independent of the outcomes in preceding periods. I hope to address
these questions in my future work.
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